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The dissertation consists of three essays. In the rst essay, I analyze the dynamic
interactions in a decentralized distribution channel, composed of a manufacturer and
a retailer, to launch an innovative durable product (IDP) whose underlying retail
demand is inuenced by word-of-mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass-type
diusion process. The word-of-mouth inuence creates a trade-o between imme-
diate and future sales/ prots, resulting in a multi-period dynamic supply chain
coordination problem. The analysis shows that the manufacturer and retailer may
have conicts regarding their trade-os and preferences between immediate and fu-
ture prots. I characterize equilibrium pricing strategies and the resulting sales and
prot trajectories. Surprisingly, I nd that the manufacturer, and sometimes even
the retailer, is better o with a myopic retailer strategy in some cases. Further-
more, I propose that revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the IDP supply chain
throughout the entire planning horizon.
vi
In the second essay, I extend the demand model by considering the impact of
shelf space allocation on the retail demand of an IDP. I assume the retail demand to
be an increasing and concave function of the merchandise displayed on the shelf. I
include a linear cost of shelf space in the retailer's objective function. I characterize
the optimal dynamic shelf space allocation and retail pricing policies for the retailer
and wholesale pricing policies for the manufacturer. I nd that a myopic retailer
allocates the constant amount of shelf-space to the IDP over the selling horizon,
whereas the shelf space allocated to the IDP by a far-sighted retailer varies over
time. Consistent with the rst essay, the manufacturer and the retailer have conict
over the retailer's protability strategy.
In the third essay, I review the Stackelberg dierential game models that study
such issues in dynamic environments as production and inventory policies, outsourc-
ing decisions, channel coordination, and competitive advertising. I introduce the ba-
sic concepts of the basics of the Stackelberg dierential games. I focus on the models
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Supply chain management is a subject that has been extensively studied by re-
searchers in operations management, marketing, and economics. Most of the papers
have focused on the static models which do not account for the eect of current
period decisions of channel members on their future actions. While the demand
may evolve gradually over time due to the word-of-mouth eect, understanding the
dynamic behavior of channel members is important for designing various strategies,
including dynamic pricing, production, inventory, outsourcing, shelf space alloca-
tion, and production capacity allocation. However, the dynamic nature of the co-
ordination aspects of these various in a distribution channel has received limited
attention in the literature. The studies by Elishberg and Steinberg (1987), Desai
(1992, 1996), and Kogan and Tapiero (2007) are the notable exceptions.
The focus here is on the dynamic nature of supply chain and marketing channel
coordination. In the rst essay, we analyze the dynamic interactions in a decentral-
ized distribution channel, composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, to launch an
innovative durable product (IDP) whose underlying retail demand is inuenced by
word-of-mouth from past adopters and follows a Bass-type diusion process. The
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retailer (she) has alternative uses for the critical resources that are essential to sell
the manufacturer's new product. The word-of-mouth inuence creates a trade-o
between immediate and future sales/ prots, resulting in a multi-period dynamic
supply chain coordination problem.
The maximization of life-cycle prots derived from an IDP presents us with a
multi-period, dynamic supply chain coordination problem. We address the following
research questions: Is it desirable for the manufacturer, through an up-front fee, to
induce the retailer to dedicate a number of her selling resources to the IDP? This
type of agreement is analogous to the store within a store practice utilized in
the retailing of consumer products. What is the benet of such an agreement for
the manufacturer, for the retailer, and for the supply chain? Finally, we ask if
it is possible to fully coordinate the supply chain throughout the entire life-cycle
of the IDP? If so, what are the terms of such contract? How will the prots be
split between the manufacturer and the retailer under a coordinating contract? We
provide explicit answers to these questions.
The complexities of the supply chain coordination issues described above cannot
be captured by a static or a single period model. In this research we develop and
analyze a dynamic multi-period model to address and provide insights into the
above questions. Our analysis shows that the manufacturer and retailer may have
conicts regarding their trade-os and preferences between immediate and future
prots. We characterize equilibrium pricing strategies and the resulting sales and
prot trajectories, and propose that revenue sharing contracts can coordinate the
IDP supply chain throughout the entire planning horizon and arbitrarily allocate
the channel prot.
In the second essay, we consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells an
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innovative durable product to an independent retailer over its life-cycle. We assume
that the product demand follows a Bass-type diusion process, and it is determined
by the market inuences, retail price of the product, and shelf-space allocated to
it. We consider the following retailer prot optimization strategies: (i) the myopic
strategy of maximizing the current-period prot and (ii) the far-sighted strategy
of maximizing the life-cycle prot. We characterize the optimal dynamic shelf space
allocation and retail pricing policies for the retailer and wholesale pricing policies
for the manufacturer. We nd that a myopic retailer allocates the constant amount
of shelf-space to the IDP over the selling horizon, whereas the shelf space allocated
to the IDP by a far-sighted retailer varies over time. Surprisingly, we nd that the
manufacturer, and sometimes even the retailer, is better o with a myopic retailer
strategy in some cases.
In the last essay, we investigate the applications of the Stackelberg dierential
game (DG) models to the supply chain management and marketing channels. Stack-
elberg dierential game models have been used to study such issues in dynamic envi-
ronments as production and inventory policy, capacity investment, dynamic pricing
for new products, shelf-space allocation over the life-cycle of the products, competi-
tive advertising, government's subsidy policy in new technology, and monetary and
scal policies in economics. This review focuses on these applications. We consider
Stackelberg equilibria as the solution concept for the games under consideration. We
shall begin our review with an introduction to the basics of the Stackelberg DGs.
We then summarize the important managerial insights obtained in each of the stud-
ies being reviewed. Finally, we point out future research avenues for applications of
the Stackelberg DGs in supply chain and marketing channel.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review
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the related literature. In Section 2, we analyze the life-cycle channel coordinations
issues in launching an IDP. In Section 3, we study the dynamic slotting and pricing
decisions in a durable product supply chain. In Section 4, we review the Stackelberg








This research addresses the strategic interactions between manufacturers with in-
novative durable products (IDPs) and the specialized retailers to sell the IDPs to
nal users; it was motivated by the distribution of Computer Aided Design (CAD)
hardware and software; however, the models developed and the results obtained
are applicable to the distribution of multiple innovative industrial products. These
products are technically very sophisticated, and buyers require extensive technical
information and attention before they commit to purchasing a unit. In this context,
the distributor/retailer needs to devote important resources to the distribution of
the product. The motivation for a manufacturer to use this Value Adding Resellers
(VARs) channel is to reach the VARs' current customer base faster and more ef-
ciently. Since these VARs are already experienced and knowledgeable in dealing
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with potential product adopters as they are already providing them with other re-
lated products and services, these VARs can reach potential customers faster and
more economically; moreover, since they are typically located in the same geograph-
ical region as their customer base, they are more ecient in providing eld support
and technical assistance regarding the product's utilization. From the perspective of
the customer, the cost of buying the IDP include not only the price of the physical
product, but also the price of the service component provided by the VAR. In this
research we aim to provide insights that will help IDP manufacturers to understand
better the strategic interactions and challenges specic to this type of distribution
channel, and provide guidelines to help them improve the eciency and protability
of their distribution systems. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst paper
to address supply chain coordination issues in a multi-period dynamic environment
for a durable product.
To analyze the strategic interactions between the manufacturer and the VARs,
we consider a stylized model of a supply chain in which a monopolist manufacturer
produces an IDP, and sells it through an independent retailer (a VAR operating in
a geographical region) who serves the nal market. We assume the retailer buys
the product from the manufacturer at a wholesale price, she adds a prot margin
on the IDP, and then she may charge a premium for the value adding services she
provides; for simplicity in the rest of the paper, we will refer by retailer price to
the total cost of acquisition and deployment for the nal customer including the
price paid by the customer for additional necessary services provided by the VAR
such as technical assistance, training, eld service etc. However, we would like to
emphasize that this view of life-cylce diers from the conventional denition; in par-
ticular, if the window of opportunity to sell the product is small enough, the IDP
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will never reach stages of maturity and decline. We assume there is an exogenously
determined (by competition or other factors) window of opportunity to sell the IDP,
and we will refer to this window of opportunity as the planning horizon or product
life-cycle. We assume there is a nite number of potential adopters for the IDP and
each potential adopter would purchase at most one unit (no repeat purchases). The
advantages of distributing an IDP through VARs are signicant, however, as we
shall discuss below, introducing an intermediary in this distribution channel creates
a host of coordination problems for the channel. In our analysis we concentrate on
the following three challenges: (a) conict of inter-temporal optimization objectives
( myopic, i.e., short-term, versus far-sighted, i.e., long-term) between the manu-
facturer and the VAR, (b) competition for resources between the IDP in question
and other products carried by the VAR and (c) double marginalization problems in
a dynamic multi-period environment. Below we elaborate each of these challenges.
(a) Conict of Inter-Temporal Optimization Objectives. The life-cycle
sales of the IDP are inuenced by retail price as well as a variety of factors including
word-of-mouth or network eects, which work through the interaction between the
current and future potential adopters. This word-of-mouth interaction suggests that
future product sales are inuenced by cumulative past sales. Correspondingly, there
is a trade-o between current and future prots when we aim to maximize the
IDP's life-cycle prots. Specically, lowering current period prices may stimulate
immediate sales possibly at the expense of immediate prots, while an increase in
the number of current adopters may increase future demand through word-of-mouth
or network inuences and possibly leading to larger future prots. Furthermore, if
both the manufacturer and the retailer make independent pricing decisions, neither
of them has full control of their protability or the protability of the supply chain.
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By setting the retail prices, the retailer can aect retail demand for the IDP, but her
protability is also aected by the wholesale prices charged by the manufacturer.
The manufacturer on the other hand can aect retail prices and sales only indirectly.
Even in cases in which the manufacturer has the ability to set the customer price
for the physical IDP, the VAR can aect the nal deployed cost for the customer by
varying the prices charged by her services and hence aect the customer demand.
Moreover, both of these supply chain partners might place signicantly dierent
values to the trade-o between immediate and future prots.
(b) Competition for Critical Selling Resources. An independent VAR
would carry multiple products thus creating a competition for limited critical selling
resources. We will refer to this case as the shared resource setting. If alternative
products provide the VAR with a high prot margin per unit of resource utilized, the
VAR will increase the IDP's sale price to increase her prot margin; the justication
of this price increase is to make it protable for her to allocate selling resources to
the IDP, but it will also have the eect of reducing the IDP's sales volume. This
competition for resources will aect negatively the manufacturer's prots and it will
hinder the IDP's diusion as well.
(c) Multi-Period Double Marginalization. Since the VAR is an indepen-
dent decision maker she will formulate her pricing strategies to maximize her own
prots disregarding the protability of the manufacturer's as well as the distribution
channel's. In our context, this will consit of a series of myopic local optimizations
(on a rolling horizon) or of a multi-period local optimization by the VAR, leading
the manufacturer to select the wholesale pricing strategy that maximizes his own
prots over the IDP's life-cycle.
The maximization of life-cycle prots derived from an IDP presents us with
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a multi-period, dynamic supply chain coordination problem, and we address the
following research questions: Is it desirable for the manufacturer, through an up-
front fee, to induce the VAR to dedicate a number of her selling resources to the IDP?
This type of agreement is analogous to the store within a store practice utilized
in the retailing of consumer products. What is the benet of such an agreement
for the manufacturer, for the retailer, and for the supply chain? Finally, we ask if
it is possible to fully coordinate the supply chain throughout the entire life-cycle of
the IDP? If so, what are the terms of such contract? How will the prots be split
between the manufacturer and the retailer under a coordinating contract?
The complexities of the supply chain coordination issues described above cannot
be captured by a static or a single period model. In this research we develop and an-
alyze a dynamic multi-period model to address and provide insights into the above
questions. Further we emphasize that the scope of application of this research is not
limited to the distribution of CAD hardware. The tradeos and conicts described
above are present in the distribution of IDPs such as complex industrial products,
high-end audio products, as well as hardware-software systems for commercial ap-
plications; in particular, the VARs distribution channels is also intensively used
by both IBM and HP to distribute computer hardware and specialized software to
commercial customers. In this latter case the services added by the intermediaries
include installation, training and technical support.
2.1.2 Overview of the Model
Following the marketing literature, we assume that the underlying retail demand of
an IDP follows a Bass-type diusion process with market dynamics modeled with a
nonlinear dierential equation. According to the Bass (1969) model, the purchase
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decisions of potential adopters of an IDP are aected by two market inuences: ex-
ternal and internal market inuence. Examples of external market inuence include
advertising, such as the manufacturer's national advertising in the mass media and
specialized trade magazines, shows and conventions, as well the retailer's (in the rest
of the paper, we will refer to the VAR as the retailer) local advertising and pro-
motional activities and sales eorts. The internal market inuence works through
the word-of-mouth and network eects spreading from the previous adopters to the
potential adopters. We incorporate the impact of retail price on retail demand,
enabling us to capture the role of an independent retailer on the dynamics of the
supply chain.
We formulate the problem in an optimal control framework. We assume that the
manufacturer takes the leader role in his relationship with the retailer. Specically,
the manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg (sequential) dierential game: the
manufacturer announces his wholesale price to the retailer, and the retailer sets
the retail price that maximizes her prots taking the manufacturer's contractual
wholesale price as given. The manufacturer takes the retailer's optimal reaction
into consideration when he makes his wholesale price decision. The solution concept
for the Stackelberg dierential game we identify is an open-loop equilibrium which
means, at the start of the game, the manufacturer and retailer decide on a strategy
that depends on time. In this study, we assume that the manufacturer is able to
credibly commit to his wholesale price strategy.
2.1.3 Key Results
We have identied a conict of preferences between the manufacturer and the re-
tailer. First, a manufacturer will not always prefer the retailer to take a long-term
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(i.e, far-sighted) optimization strategy; that is, the manufacturer sometimes is bet-
ter o if the retailer has a short-term (i.e., myopic) optimization focus. That is, in
some instances the manufacturer will prefer the retailer to react to the wholesale
prices by setting retail prices that maximizes her immediate (instantaneous) prots
at any instant rather than her long-term prots over the entire horizon. On the
other hand, the retailer's preferences over her optimization focus (short-term versus
long-term) change with the market characteristics of the IDP and they do not al-
ways agree with the manufacturer's preferences. It is not immediately obvious that
a seemingly myopic retailer behavior may enhance the performance of the supply
chain.
In the shared resources setting (the VAR distributes other products in addition
to the IDP), the manufacturer and the entire channel make lower prots than with a
dedicated resources setting in which the retailer dedicates a share of her resources to
sell exclusively the manufacturer's product. We explore the possibility of a two-part
tari, wholesale price and an up-front fee (a fee paid by the manufacturer to the
retailer for the exclusive use of a given quantity of resources), to partially improve
the channel performance.
Finally, we demonstrate that revenue sharing contracts are in principle capable
of coordinating a durable product supply chain with a long-term as well as a short-
term retailer protability focus and arbitrarily allocate the channel prot. More
specically, we show that the coordinating wholesale price for a retailer with a long
term focus is constant over the IDP's life cycle while the coordinating wholesale
price for a retailer with a short-term focus varies over time.
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2.1.4 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the
related literature. In Section 2.3, we introduce the demand model. In Section 2.4,
we study the case of a retailer with a long-term protability focus. In Section 2.5,
we study the case of a retailer with a short-term focus. In Section 2.6, we present
a numerical study that compares the case of long-term and short-term focus. In
Section 2.7, we propose an up-front fee to improve the channel performance. We
use revenue sharing contracts to fully coordinate the channel in Section 2.8. We
conclude the paper by summarizing the results and summarizing the managerial
implications and pointing out future research avenues in Section 2.9.
2.2 Literature Review
This work is related to multiple streams of literature, but the three most closely
related literatures are optimal dynamic pricing for new products, revenue sharing
contracts in supply chain management literature, and dierential games with appli-
cations in management science.
In the marketing literature, Bass (1969) and its variants have been widely used
to forecast the demand of a new durable product. We refer readers to Mahajan et
al. (1990) and Mahajan et al. (2000) for comprehensive reviews on diusion models.
The original Bass (1969) model does not include the pricing variables. A number
of later papers extended the Bass model by incorporating the (competitive) price
impact on retail demand of an IDP, including Robinson and Lakhani (1975), Bass
(1980), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), Bass and Bultez (1982), Kalish (1983), Kalish
and Lilien (1983), Clarke and Dolan (1984), Thompson and Teng (1984), Rao and
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Bass (1985), Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986), Raman and Charterjee (1995), and
Krishnan at el. (1999). Regarding the market conditions, Eliashberg and Jeuland
(1986), Thompson and Teng (1984) analyze oligopoly pricing strategies while the
rest analyze the optimal monopolist pricing strategies.
In order to derive the dynamic pricing strategies, a researcher needs to make a
key assumption about the rm's prot-maximizing strategy, i.e., the rm maximizes
the short-term or long term prots? Bass (1980) and Bass and Bultez (1982) assume
the rm maximizes the current period (instantaneous) prots. The corresponding
pricing strategies in these two papers are called myopic pricing strategies as com-
pared to (global) optimal pricing strategies which maximize the rm's aggregated
prots over the product's life cycle. Robinson and Lakhani compared the results
from the optimal pricing with the myopic pricing strategies. Their numerical results
show that the dierences are signicant while Bass and Bultez (1982) reported small
dierence.
As noted by Dolan and Jeuland (1981), it is very critical to properly incorporate
the pricing impact into the demand model. Several papers, including Robinson
and Lakhani (1975), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), and Thompson and Teng (1984),
assume the demand is an exponential function of price. In contrast, like Eliashberg
and Jeuland (1986) and Raman and Chatterjee (1995), we assume that the demand
is a linearly decreasing function of retail price. We selected this demand model to
be able to extend our analysis to explore contracting and coordination issues with
two independent echelons supply chain.
All of above papers assume a centralized decision maker will decide the pricing
strategy and by implication, production quantities. Since the above models assume
centralized decision making they are unable to examine the role that an independent
13
retailer may play in distributing the IDP.
In the supply chain management literature, various types of supply contracts
have been designed to mitigate or eliminate the double marginalization and in-
centive misalignment problems due to the independent decisions of a retailer in a
decentralized channel. We refer the readers to Krishnan et al. (2004) and Cachon
(2003) for excellent reviews on the supply contracting literature. The most relevant
papers are those that study revenue sharing contracts. For example, Gerchak and
Wang (2004) study the revenue-sharing contracts between an assembler/ retailer
and its component suppliers. In their paper, the assembler sets the shares of the
revenue then the suppliers decide delivery quantities. They show that revenue share
alone cannot coordinate the assembly system. However, a revenue sharing scheme
coupled with a subsidy paid by the assembler to component suppliers can coordinate
the assembly supply chain. Cachon and Lariviere (2005), in a newsvendor setting,
study the revenue sharing contracts between a retailer and manufacturer who sets
the wholesale price. Gerchak et al. (2006) study the revenue sharing contracts in a
decentralized Stackelberg setting in which the video rental channel and the studio
make independent decisions. However, all the above papers focus the one-shot inter-
action between the supplier (manufacturer) and the retailer. In contrast, we study
the channel coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer over the life-cycle
of the IDP in a dynamic environment, i.e., both channel members make dynamic
retail and wholesale pricing decisions rather than static decisions.
We assume that the manufacturer and the retailer play a Stackelberg dieren-
tial game. The dierential game approach is very popular to study the problems
involving dynamic environments. Mathematically, in close spirit to our approach,
Jørgensen et al. (2003) study the dynamic advertising strategies of a manufacturer
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and a retailer in a decentralized setup in which a retailer can be myopic (max-
imizes the instantaneous payo) or far-sighted (maximizes the long term payo).
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) formulated a Stackelberg dierential game to study
the interactions between a manufacturer and a downstream distributor. However,
their focus is on the joint inventory and pricing strategies of the manufacturer and
the distributor. Additionally, since they assume a constant (not varying over time)
transfer price, they do not allow the manufacturer to dynamically set the wholesale
price. By contrast, we study the optimal dynamic wholesale prices as well as dy-
namic retail prices. Additionally, their specic demand model captures the seasonal
sales uctuation while there is no diusion process involved.
2.3 The Demand Model
Amanufacturer produces an innovative durable product whose retail demand follows
Bass type diusion process. Let x (t) be the instantaneous sales rate at time t. The
demand dynamics are described by the following dierential equation:
x (t) = Ẋ (t) =
dX (t)
dt
= (M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t)) (1− γr (t)) ,
where X (t) is the cumulative sales up to time t, M is the potential market size, the
term (M −X (t)) is the unsaturated market size, α and β are positive coecients of
external and internal market inuences, respectively, and γ is a positive parameter
that measures the customers' sensitivity to the retail price r (t). According to our
formulation, x (t) is determined by three factors: the external market inuence, the
internal market inuence and price sensitivity.
A few additional comments are in order now. First, we use a multiplicatively
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separable function to model the impact of price and cumulative sales (past sales)
on the instantaneous demand rate. Second, the instantaneous sales rate x (t) is a
linearly decreasing function of retail price. Linear demand functions have been used
by researchers in the stream of dynamic pricing that particularly used Bass model,
including Eliashberg and Jeuland (1988), Raman and Chartejee (1995), and Kalish
(1983). Third, we observe that the main drivers of sales change during the entire
selling horizon an IDP. Initially, the market saturation level is low, diusion eect
outweighs saturation eect (shrinking potential market size). However, if the selling
horizon is very long, after a certain period of time, the market gets highly saturated
and every additional sale is more dicult thus we can say that the saturation eect
dominates the diusion eect.
The retailer needs certain critical resources to sell the IDP. Examples of such
resources include specialized salespeople, and in some cases equipment and facilities.
We assume that the amount of resources required are proportional to the sales
volume. Let K be the capacity of retailer's critical resources. The retailer may
have alternative protable uses other than for the manufacturer's product. It is in
the retailer's best interest to allocate the K units of resources exibly among the
products she sells. Let O be the prot margin of the alternative use; we will refer
to O as the outside prot margin for the retailer as it refers to products that are
external to the supply chain of the IDP in consideration. By implication, O will
aect the retailer's pricing decisions hence the sales volume for the IDP. By dening
the resource units appropriately, we assume that each unit of sales requires a unit of
resource. We refer to these resources as dedicated resources if the retailer only uses
them to sell the manufacturer's product and exible resources if she can exibly
allocates them among alternative products.
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We use the superscripts L and S denote the long-term and short-term retailer
protability strategy (focus), respectively. Subscripts M, R, and C denote the
manufacturer, the retailer and the channel, respectively.
2.4 A Retailer with a Long-term Focus
Consider the case of a retailer with a long-term protability strategy who maximizes
her prots over the entire life cycle T of the IDP. We assume that she has alternative
uses for her critical sales resources and exibly allocates them among the dierent
products she sells. We assume that the manufacturer and retailer play a Stackelberg
dierential game with the manufacturer acting as the leader. That is, the manu-
facturer announces the wholesale price path {wL (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} at time 0. Then
the retailer decides a retail price path {rL (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}. This retail price includes
the price the consumer pays for the physical IDP as well as the price charged by
the retailer for the service component required by the product. The retailer's in-
stantaneous prot function is given by [rL (t)− wL (t)− s] ẊL (t)+
[
K − ẊL (t)
]
O,
where s is the retailer's cost associating with selling the product. This cost should
include not only the variable costs associated with closing the sale of the physical
IDP, but it should also include the variable cost of the additional services provided.











[rL (t)− wL (t)− s]xL (t) +
(





s.t. xL (t) = (M −XL (t)) (α+ βXL (t)) (1− γrL (t)) (2.2)




where XL (0) is the initial sales condition. Note that (2.1)-(2.3) is an optimal control
problem with rL (t) and XL (t) as control and state variables, respectively. The
dierential equation (2.2) along with the initial condition (2.3) explicitly describes
how the the cumulative sales XL (t) and retail price rL (t) jointly determine the
immediate sales (demand) rate xL (t). We shall assume that the retailer has enough
capacity to sell the manufacturer's product, i.e., K ≥ xL (t) holds for ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
We rst solve the retailer's problem and use her best response to formulate the
manufacturer's problem. We formulate the retailer's problem in the optimal control
framework with a control variable rL (t) and a state variable XL (t). From now on,






= F L (1− γrL)
[




where F L = (M −XL) (α+ βXL) and λL
R
is the shadow price associated with the
state variable XL . Note that we ignore the constant term KO when formulating the
retailer's Hamiltonian. Dene fL = dF L
dXL
= −α + Mβ − 2βXL . The shadow price
λL
R







= −fL (1− γrL)
[




with the terminal value λL
R
(T ) = 0 ( because XL (T ) is free to move). Let rL∗ be the






= 0 =⇒ rL∗ =
1 + k
(






The economic interpretation of λL
R
(t) is the value of additional unit of sales. λL
R
(t) >
0 implies that the retailer benets from current sales (see Sethi and Thompson
2000 for detailed discussion of the economic interpretation of the shadow price);
accordingly, the retailer sets rL (t) below the myopic retail response which is dened
as the price that would result if we set λL
R
(t) = 0. With the myopic retail response,
the retailer does not take into account the impact of current sales on future sales.
On the other hand, when λL
R
(t) < 0, the retailer has no incentive to sacrice current
prots for future prots, and she will increase rL (t) above the myopic price level.
Let HL∗
R















It is easy to verify that HL∗
R
is concave and continuously dierentiable with respect
to XL for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore rL∗ is an optimal path.
Note that for each wholesale price path {wL (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} the manufacturer
announces, there is a corresponding optimal retail price path {rL∗ (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]}.
The manufacturer takes the retailer's best response into consideration when solving
his optimization problem. Assume that the manufacturer incurs a constant per unit
production cost c0 . The manufacturer's optimization problem is given by:
ΠL∗
M
































(T ) = 0, (2.9)
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where the expressions for xL∗ and λ̇L
R
are obtained by substituting (2.6) into (2.2)
and (2.5), respectively. Note that the manufacturer has two state variables: XL∗ and
λ̇L
R
. Dockner et. al. (2000) used a similar approach. By now, we have dened a two-































































with boundary conditions λL
M
(T ) = 0 and µ (0) = 0.We impose λL
R
(T ) = 0 because
XL (T ) is free to move and impose µ (0) = 0 because our problem is controllable, i.
e., the associated initial state λL
R










































k (2F L∗ + µfL∗)
, (2.14)






− s−O − c0
)






2γ (2F L∗ + µfL∗)
(2.15)








4γ (2F L∗ + µfL∗)
.
Substituting (2.14) into (2.7), (2.8), (2.11), and (2.12), respectively, we have:
xL∗ =
ψL [F L∗]2











L∗ [ψL ]2 {2fL∗F L∗ + µ [2 (fL∗)2 + 2βF L∗]}
4γ (2F L∗ + µfL∗)2
(2.18)
µ̇ = − ψ
L (F L∗)2
2 (2F L∗ + µfL∗)
. (2.19)
with boundary conditions
XL (0) = X0L , µ (0) = 0, λL
R
(T ) = λL
M
(T ) = 0. (2.20)
We assume that Sign (ψL) = Sign (2F L∗ + µfL∗) to guarantee that the right-hand
side of Equation (2.16) is positive. Comparing Equation (2.9) to Equation (2.16),
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we nd that µ̇ = −ẊL∗ < 0, for ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies that µ (t) < 0,∀t ∈ [0, T ],
because we have µ (0) = 0. Equations (2.16)-(2.19) consist a system of four dif-
ferential equations with four unknowns, which, along with the boundary conditions
(2.10), imply a solution; however, it is very dicult to derive analytical solutions
for all the variables as functions of time and system parameters (See Eliashberg and
Jeuland (1986) for a discussion of the complexity of the solutions to a similar system
of non-linear dierential equations.).
We observe, from Equation (2.17), that the sign of λ̇L
R
depends on the sign of
fL∗: if fL∗ = −α + Mβ − 2βXL∗ > 0, λ̇L
R






2.5 A Retailer with a Short-term Focus
For a given wholesale price contract, it is always to the retailer's advantage to set the
retail prices with a life-cycle (global) optimization objective. However, the manufac-
turer adjusts the wholesale prices that he will oer the retailer taking into account
the retailer's optimization objective; in this situation, it is not clear that the life-
cycle optimization strategy will be in the retailer's best interest. Specically, if the
manufacturer knows that the retailer sets retail prices with a short-term protabil-
ity strategy, and then oers the retailer the wholesale prices under this assumption,
the retailer may be better o than if the manufacturer assumes that she sets the
retail prices with a long-term protability strategy and oers her wholesale prices
reecting this long-term strategy. To study this hypothesis, we model the optimal
pricing strategy of the manufacturer under the assumption that the retailer sets the
retail prices with a short-term optimization objective. At the end of section, we
discuss alternative incentives that may lead to the short-term retailer protability
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strategy.
With a short-term protability strategy, at any time t, the retailer maximizes





{[rS (t)− wS (t)− s]xS (t) +O [K − xS (t)]}
s.t. xS (t) = F S (XS (t)) [1− γrS (t)] , XS (0) = XS
0
,∀t ∈ [0, T ] (2.21)
where F S (XS (t)) = (M −XS (t)) (α+ βXS (t)). Similar to the case of a long-term
protability strategy, we shall assume that K ≥ xS (t) holds for ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. From




[1 + γ (wS + s+O)] . (2.22)
The manufacturer takes the retailer's best response into the consideration when
solving his own optimization problem. He maximizes the life cycle prots and his
optimization problem is given by:
ΠS∗
M








F S [1− γ (wS + s+O)] , XS (0) = XS
0
. (2.23)
where the expression for xS is obtained by substituting (2.22) into (2.21). The
manufacturer has a control variable wS and a state variable xS . His Hamiltonian




F S [1− k (wS + s+O)] [wS − c0 + λS ] ,
23
where λS is the shadow price associated with the state variable XS . Let fS = dF S
dXS
=






fS [1− γ (wS + s+O)] [wS − c0 + λS ] (2.24)
with the boundary condition λS (T ) = 0. We can determine the optimal control wS






[1 + γ (c0 − s−O − λS)] . (2.25)
The maximized Hamiltonian HS∗is given by:
HS∗ =
F S [1 + γ (λS − c0 − s−O)]2
8k
.
We can verify that HS∗ is concave in XS and continuously dierentiable with respect
to XS for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore wS∗ is an optimal path.
Substituting wS∗ into (2.21)-(2.23), we derive the optimal retail price, instanta-












[1 + γ (λS − s−O − c0)]2 . (2.28)
The solution to the problem is determined by (2.27) and (2.28) together with bound-
ary conditions: XS (0) = XS
0
and λS (T ) = 0. We will characterize the equilibrium
in terms of cumulative sales in the following several lemmas.
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The following lemma derives the relationship between λS and XS∗. Dene φ̄ =
1 − γ (c0 + s+O), a function of the system parameters, and assume the values of
the parameters are such that φ̄ > 0.





F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
F S∗ (XS∗ (t))
− 1
]
, t ∈ [0, T ] . (2.29)




S∗ (xS∗ (τ)) [1 + γ (λS (τ)− s−O − c0)]
2γF S∗ (xS∗ (τ))
=⇒ γdλ
S (τ)
[1 + γ (λS (τ)− s−O − c0)]
= −f
S∗ (xS∗ (τ)) dXS∗ (τ)











fS∗ (xS∗ (τ)) dXS∗ (τ)
2F S∗ (xS∗ (τ))





F S∗ (xS∗ (τ)) |XS
∗(T )
XS∗(t)
=⇒ 1− γ (s+O + c0)
1 + γ (λS (t)− s−O − c0)
=
√
F S∗ (xS∗ (t))
F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
=⇒ λS (t) = 1− γ (c0 + s+O)
γ
[√
F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))




with λS (T ) = 0. We obtain the expression in Lemma 2.1.















< 1, i.e., F S∗ (XS∗ (T )) <
F S∗ (XS∗ (t)), λS (t) < 0. Lemma 2.1 enables us to eliminate λS from the optimality
conditions and characterize the variables in terms of the cumulative sales XS∗ (t).
lemma 2.2. With a short-term retailer protability strategy, for t ∈ [0, T ],
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(i) The instantaneous shadow price λ̇S (t) is given by
λ̇S (t) = − φ̄
2fS∗ (XS∗ (t))
8γ
F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
F S∗ (XS∗ (t))
.








F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))






2 (1− γ (s+O))− φ̄
√
F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
F S∗ (XS∗ (t))
]
.





F S∗ (XS∗ (t))F S∗ (XS∗ (T )).
























F S∗ (XS∗ (t))F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))− F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
)
.
Proof: (i) Substituting the result from Lemma 2.1 into Equation (2.28), we
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have
λ̇S (t) = −f





F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
F S∗ (xS∗ (t))
.







F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))







2 (1− γ (s+O))− φ̄
√
F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
F S∗ (xS∗ (t))
]
.





F S∗ (xS∗ (t))F S∗ (xS∗ (T )).








(t) = (wS∗ − c0)xS∗.
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F S∗ (xS∗ (t))F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))− F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
]
.
remarks. According to part (i), the sign of λ̇S (t) is determined by the sign of
fS∗ (XS∗ (t)): we have λ̇S (t) > 0 when
fS (XS∗ (t)) = −α+Mβ − 2βXS∗ (t) < 0
, i.e., XS∗ (t) > −α+Mβ
2β
, and λ̇S (t) < 0, when XS∗ (t) < −α+Mβ
2β
. This result is
consistent with that in the case of a retailer with a long-term protability strategy.
According to part (iv), RS∗ (t) is equal to the ratio of the end-of-horizon
instantaneous sales rate to the instantaneous sales rate at any instant t.
According to part (v), the retailer achieves a constant instantaneous prot rate
over time. This result is surprising because both the instantaneous sales volume
xS∗ (t) and the retail margin vary over time. Our assumption of multiplicativly
separable demand function partially contributes to this result. On the other hand,
the manufacturer's instantaneous prot rate varies over time.
Proposition 2.1. The optimal retail price rS∗, wholesale price wS∗ and in-
stantaneous sales rate ẊS∗peak at the same time. We can observe three retail/
wholesale pricing patterns, depending on the system parameters.
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, rS∗ (t) and wS∗ (t) are both monotonically increasing
over the entire selling horizon.




> XS (0), rS∗ (t) and wS∗ (t) are increasing up to
the peak sales and decreasing thereon.




, rS∗ (t) and wS∗ (t) are monotonically decreasing
over the entire selling horizon.










, F S∗ (XS∗ (t)) is an increasing function of XS∗ (t)




decreases over time t. From
Lemma 2.2(ii),rS∗and wS∗are both increasing over the entire selling horizon.




, F S∗ (XS∗ (t)) is an increasing function of XS∗ (t) for
t ∈ [0, t1 ], where t1 is such that X (t1) = M2 −
α
2β
, while F S∗ (XS∗ (t)) is a decreasing
function of XS∗ (t) throughout the horizon for t ∈ [t1 , T ]. Therefore rS∗ and wS∗
increase up to t1then decrease.





, F S∗ (XS∗ (t)) is an decreasing function of XS∗ (t)
throughout the entire horizon. Therefore rS∗ and wS∗ are monotonically decreasing
over the entire horizon.
Proposition 2.1 states that we may observe three dierent patterns of retail and
wholesale prices: monotonically increasing, increasing then declining, and mono-
tonically declining. The ultimate determinant of pricing patterns is the interaction
between the demand dynamics: the diusion eect (word-of-mouth) and the sat-
uration eect. When the market saturation level is low, the word-of-mouth eect
stimulates sales, i.e., the diusion eect outweighs the saturation eect, the retailer
(manufacturer) will start with relatively low price to stimulate early sales. As the
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sales grows, the saturation eect takes its turn, the retailer (manufacturer) will price
high to capture the immediate prot rather than sacricing current prots for future
prots. This result is a generalization of Kalish (1983). Kalish examined the optimal
dynamic pricing strategy within a centralized channel setting. Here we show that
with a short-term retailer protability strategy, the optimal retail price and whole-
sale price patterns should follow the sales curves. In contrast, in the decentralized
channel with a long-term retailer protability strategy, neither the retail price nor
the wholesale price pattern mimic the sales curves as illustrated by Figures 2.1 and
2.2.
Figure 2.1: Retail price under long-term and short-term strategies
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Figure 2.2: Instantaneous sales rate under long-term and short-term strategies
Note: the parameters are M = 4 × 107 , X0 = 1 × 107 , α = 0.016, β = 8 × 10−9 , γ =
5× 10−4 , c0 = $100, s = $10, O = 0, T = 10.
From Lemma 2.2, we have demonstrated the importance of obtaining the cu-
mulative sales trajectory XS∗ (t). The following provides a method to calculate the
equilibrium cumulative sales up to time t, XS∗ (t).
lemma 2.3. The equilibrium (optimal) cumulative sales trajectory XS∗ (t) can




















βF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
(2.30)
P roof : Dene a function G = − fS√
F S
. We can show that G (t) is an increasing









The proof of Lemma 2.3 will proceed in two steps. First we show that Equation
(2.30) holds. Second, we show the uniqueness of solution. The second step itself





F S∗ (XS∗ (t))F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
=⇒ dX
S∗ (t)√




F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))dt
4
.
Integrating the left hand side of equation from XS (0) to XS∗ (t) and right hand side


















α− βM + 2βXS∗ (τ)
2
√






F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
Rearranging the terms, we will get the result in (2.30).
Next we shall show the uniqueness of solution to (2.30). In the rst substep, we
show that the following equation provides a unique solution for XS∗ (T ):
tan
−1 fS∗ (XS∗ (T ))
2
√
βF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
= tan
−1 fS (XS (0))
2
√








Dene the following functions:






−1 fS (XS (0))
2
√








4F = F1 (X)− F2 (X) .
where F S∗ (X) = (M −X) (α+ βX) and fS∗ (X) = −α + βM − 2βX. We have
shown that have G is a strictly increasing function of X, hence F1 is strictly in-
creasing in X as well. So the uniqueness of solution can be easily extended to any
instant t. We will focus on proving the uniqueness of the solution to (2.30). We will
proceed the proof in three steps listed as follows:
Step One: Prove that there is at least one solution to the equation;
Step Two: Prove that there is at most one extreme point for 4F ;
Step Three: Prove F1 and F2 intersect with each other either within
(













, but not both.
Next we will prove this part according to the steps specied above.
Step One: Prove that there is at least one solution to the equation.
Checking the sign of 4F at XS (0) and X →M . We have limX→M F2 (X) = 0.
Since F1 is increasing inX, we have4F (X →M) = limX→M 4F = limX→M (F1 − F2) =
limX→M F1 > 0. At X = X0 ,we have
4F (X = X0) = −
T φ̄
√
βF S∗ (XS (0))
4
< 0.
Therefore we have 4F dierent signs at X = X0 and X → M. We conclude that
there is at least one solution to equation (2.30) within (XS (0) ,M).
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Step Two: Prove that there is at most one extreme point for 4F .







8− T φ̄fS∗ (X)
8
.
The unique solution to d4F
dX)






. Hence we conclude that there






is within or out of (XS (0) ,M).
Step Three: Prove that there is a unique solution.
It is easy to show that F2 is an increasing function of X for an arbitrary X ∈(














show that F1 and F2 intersect with each other only once, i.e, they either intersect
within the region
(













, but not both.













−1 fS (XS (0))√
2βF S (XS (0))
− T φ̄ (α+ βM)
2







> 0 to hold, we need
tan
−1 fS (XS (0))√
βF S (XS (0))





βF S (XS (0))
> tan
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, then there is an extreme point within













= Sign [4F (X = X0)] ,
the intersection must fall in
(










































Now we have proved that there is unique solution of XS∗ (T ). We can show that
there is unique solution of XS∗ (t). .
Managerially, Lemma 2.3 is very useful for two major reasons. First, it is useful
for forecasting purposes. The manufacturer can assess the life time cumulative
sales XS∗ (T ) using (30) to solve for the unique solution. Note that XS∗ (T ) is a
function of initial sales XS (0) and parameters of the problem. Once the life time
cumulative sales is obtained, the cumulative sales trajectory XS∗ (t) for any given
time t is determined as well as the wholesale and retail price trajectories. Second,
the managers can plan for operations decisions such as production rate, production
capacity, and distribution channel capacity installation at any instant t.
Let ΠS∗
SC
(T ) denote the channel prot up to time t, which is the sum of the
manufacturer's and retailer's prots from selling the manufacturer's product. The








(T ), in terms of the cumulative sales XS∗ (t).
Lemma 2.4. Let 4XS∗ (t) = XS∗ (t)−XS (0).
(i) The manufacturer's optimal cumulative prot up to time t, ΠS∗
M
(t), and
retailer's optimal cumulative prot up to time t, ΠS∗
R
























(ii) The life-cycle supply chain prots ΠS∗
SC




[1− γ (c0 + s)]4XS∗ (T )
γ
− φ̄
2TF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
16γ
.








(t) from time 0 to t to obtain the retailer's cumulative prot up to





+ tKO. From Lemma 2.2(iii), we have
xS∗ (t) = φ̄
4
√



















F S∗ (xS∗ (τ))dτ =
4 [XS∗ (t)−XS (0)]
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√
F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))































F S∗ (xS∗ (τ))dτ − tφ̄





F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
4γ
4 [XS∗ (t)−XS (0)]
φ̄
√
F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
− tφ̄
2F S∗ (xS∗ (T ))
8γ
=
φ̄ [XS∗ (t)−XS (0)]
γ
− tφ̄
2F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
8γ
From (2.30), for t = T , we have:
tan
−1 fS∗ (XS∗ (T ))
2
√
βF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
= tan
−1 fS (XS (0))
2
√




βF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
.
Taking the derivative of both sides of (2.30) with regard to O, we have:
1√






F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
+
φ̄TfS∗ (XS∗ (T ))
8
√
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4
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S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
8− φ̄TfS∗ (XS∗ (T ))
Taking the derivative of ΠS∗
M










T φ̄F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
− T φ̄














T φ̄F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
4
= −4XS∗ (T ) < 0
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2.4(ii) From the denition, we have
ΠS∗
SC
(T ) = ΠS∗
M









(T ) + ΠS∗
R





2F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
8γ
+
T φ̄2F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
16γ
+KOT −KOT +O4XS∗ (T )
=
[1− γ (c0 + s)]4XS∗ (T )
γ
− T φ̄
2F S∗ (XS∗ (T ))
16γ
We conclude this section by pointing out that the retailer's strategy of having a
short-term strategy may or may not be optimal from the retailer's perspective, as
will be discussed in the following section.
2.6 Numerical Analysis: Long-term Focus versus
Short-term Focus
We have analyzed the models with both the long-term and short-term retailer prof-
itability strategies. Our analysis so far leaves open the following questions: Will the
retailer and manufacturer have conicts over the preferred retailer protability strat-
egy? If so, under what conditions will they have conicts? A priori, it is not clear
whether the long-term protability objective will be preferred when both the retailer
and manufacturer solve their global optimization problem. We must recognize that
this sequential local maximization will not necessarily lead to a better global solu-
tion than if the retailer has a short term optimization focus. Let i and j denote the
manufacturer's and retailer's preferences, respectively. Accordingly, there are four
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possible combinations of preferences, i.e., {i, j} = {L,L} , {L, S} , {S, L} , {S, S}.
Preferences Over the Retailer's Protability Strageties. We conducted
a numerical study with dierent values of T and β. Table 2.1 reports the preferred
retailer strategy, market saturation level, and prot gain with dierent combinations
of T and β. We have a few observations. First, we can observe all four combinations
of preferences. In some cases, the manufacturer and the retailer have aligned pref-
erences over the retailer protability strategy while in other cases, they may have
conicts. Second, for a xed value of β, preferences shift in the following order:
{L,L}, {L, S}, {S, S} and {S, L} as T increases. Moreover, for a xed value of T ,
preferences shifts in the same order as β increases. Third, the preferences of both
parties depend on the level of market saturation at the end of the selling horizon.
Finally, the conicts between the manufacturer and the retailer can be signicant
when the market is highly saturated at the end of the selling horizon, i.e., when
either T or β or both are very large. For example, when the market penetration
level is over 80%, the manufacturer's prot gain is between 10% and 18% with his
preferred protability strategy while the retailer's prot gain is more signicant: it
can be from 13% to 115%. However, when the market is not highly saturated, the
conict is far less signicant.
In a decentralized channel, due to the dierences in the cost structure, the man-
ufacturer and the retailer see dierent future benets of current sales therefore they
make a dierent adjustment of their pricing strategies when they are trading o
current with future prots. For both the manufacturer and the retailer, shadow
prices represent the future value of an additional sale. The determination of the
magnitude of the shadow prices and therefore the trade-os depends on the market
saturation level which itself depends on the particular parameter settings such as T ,
39
α and β. When the combination of these parameters leads to high levels of market
penetration, the saturation eect will reduce the retailer's shadow price eventually
reaching negative levels; this saturation eect will lead the retailer to increase her
prot margins. A higher retail price is not in the manufacturer's interest there-
fore the manufacturer will switch his preference to a myopic retailer protability
strategy when the market reaches high enough saturation level at the end of the
horizon.
The retailer's preferences are more complex to explain because she needs to bal-
ance (a) the cost due to the myopic pricing decision and (b) the gain, in terms
of favorable wholesale price terms received from the manufacturer under this my-
opic retailer strategy. When the window of opportunity to sell the IDP leads to
a low level of market saturation, the manufacturer is interested in stimulating the
diusion of the IDP and he oers favorable wholesale price terms when the re-
tailer cooperates with his diusion goal by lowering the retail price ( a long-term
protability strategy). When the window of opportunity is long enough, the man-
ufacturer's wholesale price terms are not attractive to the retailer and she switches
her preference to a short-term protability strategy. When the market saturation
level is extremely high, the retailer knows additional sales will be very low so she
is interested in milking the market and switches her preference to a long-term
protability strategy (in this case the shadow price is negative so she will increase
her prot margins) regardless of the manufacturer's wholesale price increase as a
reaction to her long-term optimization preference.
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Table 2.1: Prefered retailer focus, market saturation, and prot gain
T β = 2.5× 10−9 β = 8× 10−9 β = 2× 10−8 β = 5× 10−8
P SL G P S G P SL G P SL G
1 − − − {L, L} (27, 27) < 1 {L, L} (29, 29) (2, 2) {L, L} (36, 36) (5, 3)
2 − − − {L, L} (29, 29) (2, 1) {L, L} (34, 33) (4, 3) {L, S} (49, 48) (5, 4)
5 {L, L} (28, 28) (3, 1) {L, L} (35, 34) (3, 2) {L, S} (49, 48) (4, 4) {S, S} (74, 74) (5, 19)
10 {L, L} (32, 32) (5, 1) {L, S} (45, 45) (4, 2) {S, S} (68, 68) (2, 17) {S, S} (90, 90) (12, 10)
25 {L, S} (44, 45) (1, 3) {S, S} (70, 70) (4, 17) {S, S} (88, 88) (12, 9) {S, L} (91, 98) (13, 23)
100 {S, S} (80, 80) (10, 13) {S, L} (87, 95) (14, 8) {S, L} (94, 99) (11, 50) {S, L} (97, 99) (18, 115)
200 {S, L} (83, 92) (14, 1) − − − − − − − − −
Notes. Parameters are M = 4 × 107 , X0 = 1 × 10
7
, α = 0.016, k = 5 × 10−4 , c0 = $100,
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tability foci
















denote the combination of the manufacturer's















100%, i.e., the percentage of the prot gain to the manufacturer (retailer) with a preferred retailer
protability strategy, where πP
M(R)
(T ) denote the manufacturer (retailer) 's life-cycle prot under
his (her) preferred retailer protability strategy.
Wholesale Price Contracts Implementation Issues. Clearly, it is impor-
tant to understand what the resulting wholesale price contracts will be under dier-
ent scenarios. For scenarios {L,L} and {L, S}, the manufacturer oers the whole-
sale price contract assuming that the retailer will be farsighted and he may safely
do so because for a given wholesale price strategy, the retailer is better o being
far-sighted no matter her preferences are. For the scenarios {S, S} and {S, L}, the
manufacturer oers the wholesale price contract assuming that the retailer will be
myopic. However, in order to implement these wholesale price contracts, the man-
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ufacturer needs to monitor the retailer's sales volume or retail price at any instant
of time. Without monitoring, for a given wholesale price, the retailer is better o
setting the retail price with a long-term perspective. Note that for scenarios {L, S}
and {S, L}, the resulting wholesale price contracts are consistent with the manufac-
turer's preferences, but not in the retailer's rst preference, so there may be some
implementation resistance from the retailer.
Although larger αand β lead to increased life-cycle supply chain prots, the eect
of larger values of αand β on the split of this prot between the manufacturer and
the retailer is not straightforward. When the selling window leads to a low level of
market saturation, the retailer will tend to capture a higher share of the prot than
when the selling window allow high levels of market saturation.
2.7 Two-part Contracts
Without additional transfers of prots from the manufacturer to the VAR, the VAR
will consider the opportunity cost O of diverting sale resources from alternative
products to the IDP when making pricing decisions (see (2.1) and (2.21)). We
shall demonstrate in this section that the existence of alternative products in the
retailer's portfolio competing with the IDP for sales resources, creates for the retailer
a exibility in allocation of resources, which hurts the manufacturer as well as the
IDP's supply chain. As a possibility to overcome this problem, we consider a lump-
sum up-front payment A paid by the manufacturer to the retailer for the exclusive
use of sale resources to the IDP. Once these resources are contractually allocated to
the IDP, the retailer foregoes the possibility of using these resources for an alternative
product, making the opportunity cost of dedicating these resources to the IDP
eectively equal to zero. We assume that this contractual agreement is initiated by
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the manufacturer. If the retailer accepts the terms of trade with an upfront fee, she
entirely dedicates the K units of resources to the manufacturer.
We assume that the manufacturer knows the protability objective of the retailer,
i.e., either a long-term or a short-term strategy. The sequence of events is as follows:
At date 1, the manufacturer launches a new product and proposes two terms of trade
(contracts), a two-part contract, i.e., a wholesale price coupled with an up-front fee,
{A,w (t)}, and a wholesale-price-only contract, {w (t)}. At date 2, the retailer
decides which contract to choose. At date 3, she decides the retail price path and
thereby her instantaneous sales rate, depending on the contract she chose at date
2. At date 4, production and trade occur. We assume that when the retailer is
indierent between the two contracts, she will choose the one with an up-front fee.
2.7.1 Two-part Contracts with a Long-term Focus
Let ΠLD∗
R
(T ) be the life cycle prots obtained by the retailer who accepts the two-
part contract {A,w (t)} to dedicate her selling resources to the manufacturer's IDP.
Note that ΠLD∗
R
(T ) can be obtained by solving (1) with O = 0. A rational retailer
with a long-term strategy accepts a two-part contract with an upfront payment
A only if she earns no less than she does under the wholesale-price-only contract
(Incentive Compatibility Constraint), mathematically,
ΠLD∗
R
(T ) + A ≥ ΠL∗
R
(T ) . (2.31)
Given her acceptance of the two-part contract, the retailer regards the outside prot
margin O and the allowance A as sunk costs and foregoes them when setting her
dynamical retail price strategy.
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The manufacturer decides whether to induce the dedicated retail resources. He
needs to compare the maximum prot he earns with a two-part contract to that
with a wholesale price contract. If it is protable for him to induce the retailer
to accept the up-front payment, the manufacturer would extract the entire gain in
channel prot, i.e., the manufacturer will make the retailer break-even between the
two-part contract and wholesale-price-only contract. The manufacturer will oer the




(T ) coupled with the corresponding
transfer price wLD∗ (t) if it is to his advantage or just a transfer price contract wL∗ (t).
Let πLD∗
M
(T ) and πL∗
M
(T ) be the manufacturer's prots with dedicated and exible
resources, respectively. The manufacturer oers an up-front fee only if he is not worse
o than with a wholesale-price alone contract, i.e., ΠLD∗
M
(T )− ABEL ≥ ΠL∗
M
(T ) .
2.7.2 Two-part Contracts with a Short-term Focus
Let ΠSD∗
R
(T ) be the retailer's life cycle prot with a short-term protability strategy
who accepts the two-part contract {A,w (t)}. The analysis in the section parallels
that of a retailer with a long-term protability strategy. Her participation constraint
for a two-part contract is:
ΠSD∗
R
(T ) + A ≥ ΠS∗
R
(T ) , (2.32)
Let πSD∗
R
(T ) be the manufacturer's prot from the sales of the product (with the ded-
icated resources). The two-part contract oered to the retailer will be {AS , wSD∗ (t)}
where ABES = ΠS∗
R
(T ) − ΠSD∗
R
(T ). Alternatively, if ΠSD∗
M
(T ) − ABES < ΠS∗
M
(T )
, the manufacturer will simply oer a transfer price contract wS∗ (t). Let φ =
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1− γ (c0 + s) , a function of parameters.






2 (1− γs)− φ
√
F SD∗ (XSD∗ (T ))
F SD∗ (XSD∗ (t))
]
and ABES is given by:
ABES = KOT +
φ̄2
16γ
TF S∗ (XS∗ (T ))− φ
2
16γ
TF SD∗ (XSD∗ (T )) ;
(i) The retailer's cumulative life-cycle prot ΠSD∗
R
(T ) is given by ΠSD∗
R




(ii) The manufacturer's life-cycle prot ΠSD∗
M

















= −4XSD∗ (T ) < 0.
Two-part contracts may improve the manufacturer-retailer channel eciency;
however, for many situations (e.g., a large outside prot margin), such contracts
may not be feasible, as the additional prot cannot recoup the retailer's loss. In
other words, the manufacturer cannot aord to pay a high up-front fee to secure
the retailer's resources. Even in the situations that this two-part tari contract is
implementable, such a mechanism cannot achieve full channel coordination
because it cannot overcome the double marginalization problem. In the next
section, we explore the utilization of revenue sharing contracts to increase the
supply chain performance.
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2.8 Revenue Sharing Contracts
In this section, we use revenue sharing contracts to coordinate the channel. Sub-
section 1.8.1 determines the benchmark solution, i.e., the integrated channel's retail
price, sales and prot rate trajectories. Subsection 1.8.2 studies the coordination
with a long-term retailer protability strategy. Subsection 1.8.3 studies the revenue
sharing contract with a short-term retailer protability strategy. Subsection 1.8.4
discusses the channel coordination implications of retailer protability strategy and
combined sharing contract with an upfront fee.
2.8.1 Integrated Channel
We now consider an integrated channel in which the manufacturer is the central
decision maker. The channel maximizes the life cycle prot obtained from selling
the IDP. The channel incurs a constant per unit production cost c0 and a selling cost
s. This problem corresponds to a specialization of the demand function in Kalish
(1983). For this special case, we obtain an implicit expression for the optimal
sales trajectory (Lemma 2.7) and we are able to express the optimal retail price
trajectory (Lemma 2.6) and the optimal prot trajectory (Lemma 2.8) as functions
of the cumulative sales. The integrated channel's prot maximization problem is
given by




[rI (t)− c0 − s] ẊI (t) dt
s.t. xI = (M −XI ) (α+ βXI ) (1− γrI ) , XI (0) = XI
0
Dene f I = dF I
dXI
= −α + βM − 2βXI . Let λI (t) denote the shadow price as-
sociated with the state variable XI . Using a similar approach to the one applied
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in the previous several sections, we establish the relationship between the optimal
cumulative sales XI∗ and shadow price λI trajectories in the following lemma. Let





F I∗ (t) = (M −XI∗ (t)) (α+ βXI∗ (t)), ∀t ∈ [0, T ].





F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
− 1
)
, t ∈ [0, T ] .
Proof: Similar to the proofs of lemma 2.2.1 and 2, respectively.
Lemma 2.6. For the integrated channel, the optimal retail price rI∗, the in-







F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))













F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))F I∗ (XI∗ (t))− F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
]
Proof: Similar to the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
Lemma 2.7. The optimal cumulative sales trajectory XI∗ (t) is determined by




f I∗ (XI∗ (t))
2
√





f I (XI (0))
2
√





βF I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
2
Using the results from Lemma 2.6 and 7, we can now establish the prot trajectory
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to the integrated channel.





F I∗ (XI∗ (t))F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
=⇒ dX
I∗ (t)√




F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))dt
2
Integrating the left hand side of equation from XI (0) to XI∗ (t) and right hand side


















α− βM + 2βXI∗ (τ)
2
√






F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
2
Rearrange the above equation and we will get the equation in Lemma. .
Lemma 2.8. Dene 4XI∗ (t) = XI∗ (t) − XI (0). The optimal integrated





2F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
.


















F I∗ (XI∗ (t))dt
=⇒ 4XI∗ (t) = φ
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√















F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
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Integrating the left hand side equation from πI (0) = 0 to πI∗ (t) and the right hand





πI∗ (τ) dτ =
φ2
√








F I∗ (XI∗ (t))−
√












F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
− t
√






2F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
We will use these results to study the channel coordination with revenue sharing
contracts in the next two subsections.
2.8.2 Revenue Sharing with a Long-term Focus
We consider a revenue sharing contract with two parameters {qL , ŵL (t)}, where
qL ∈ [0, 1] is the manufacturer's share of revenue per unit sold by the retailer and
ŵL (t) is the wholesale price that the manufacturer charges the retailer per unit at
time t. qL is assumed to be constant over time. Note that we use the hat-accent 
ˆ  to indicate that the variable is associated with a revenue sharing contract. The
manufacturer's objective is to set ŵL (t) such that the supply chain prot (sales) is
the same as that with achieved by an integrated channel. The sequence of events is
as follows: On date 1, the manufacturer announces the {qL , ŵL (t)}; On date 2, the
retailer decides the retail price trajectory thereby the instantaneous sales rate with
an aim to maximize her life-cycle prot; On date 3, production starts and trade
occurs. We assume that the revenue sharing contract is not accompanied by an
up-front fee so the retailer takes the O into consideration when dynamically setting
the retail price.
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The problem for the retailer with a long-term strategy is formulated as follows:
π̂L∗
R





[(1− qL) r̂L (t)− ŵL (t)− s] ˙̂XL (t) +O
[


















(T ) as the maximum channel prots obtained from selling the manufacturer's
product.
Theorem 2.1. Consider a revenue sharing contract with qL ∈ [0, 1] and the
wholesale price trajectory ŵL∗ (t) set as follows ŵL∗ (t) =(1− qL) c0−qLs−O.
(i)The retailer's instantaneous prot rate is given by
π̂L∗
R
(t) = (1− qL)πI∗ (t) +KO
and her life-cycle prot is given by Π̂L∗
R
(T ) = (1− qL) ΠI∗ (T ) +KOT .
(ii) The manufacturer's instantaneous prot rate is given by
π̂L∗
M
(t) = qLπI∗ (t)−OxI∗ (t)
and his life-cycle prot is given by Π̂L∗
M
(T ) = qLΠI∗ (T )−O4XI∗ (T ).
(iii) The above revenue sharing contract coordinates the channel, i.e.,
Π̂L∗
SC
(T ) = ΠI∗ (T ). The retailer's instantaneous sales rate is xI∗ (t) and the retail
price is set at rI∗ (t).
(iv) When O = 0, the revenue sharing contract leads to prot sharing between the
manufacturer and retailer.
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Proof: To get the optimal retail price, we take the rst order condition of ĤL
R
with regard to r̂L to obtain:
∂ĤLR
∂r̂L
= 0 =⇒ −γ
[




+ (1− qL) [1− γr̂L (t)] = 0
=⇒ r̂L (t) =
1− qL + γ
(





The shadow price λ̂L
R








= −f̂L∗ (1− γr̂L)
[
(1− qL) r̂L − ŵL − s−O + λ̂L
R
]
The manufacturer sets the wholesale price such that






F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
]
.
The corresponding ŵL∗ (t) is obtained by;
1− qL + γ
(











F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
]






F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))













(t) = −(1− q
L)φ2f I∗ (XI∗ (t))
4γ
F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
Recall that we have x̂L
R
(t) = xI (t) = φ
2
√
F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))F I∗ (XI∗ (t)). We can estab-
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φf I∗ (XI∗ (t)) (1− qL)
√
F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
2γ [F I∗ (XI∗ (t))]
3/2
=⇒









F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
2γ
∫ FI (T )
FI (t)






F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
2γ







F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
− 1
)
We note that λ̂L
R
(t) = (1− qL)λI
R
(t) . Substituting λ̂L
R
(t) and λI (t) into ŵL∗ (t), we
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F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))






F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))




= (1− qL) (c0 + s)− s−O
Obviously, ŵL (t) is constant across time.





(t) = [(1− qL) rL∗ (t)− ŵL∗ (t)− s] x̂L∗ +O (K − x̂L∗)


















= KOT + (1− qL) ΠI∗ (T )
Theorem 2.1 (ii). The manufacturer's instantaneous prot rate π̂L∗
M
(t) is given by:
π̂L∗
M
(t) = [ŵL∗ − c0 + qL r̂L∗] x̂L∗
= [(1− qL) (c0 + s)− s−O − c0 + qL r̂L∗] x̂I∗
= [−qL (c0 + s)−O + qL r̂L∗] x̂I∗
= qLπI∗ (t)−Ox̂I∗
The manufacturer's life-cycle prot Π̂L∗
M






[ŵL∗ − c0 + qL r̂L∗] x̂L∗dt
= qLΠI∗ (T )−O4XI∗ (T )




(T ) = Π̂L∗
M










(T ) and Π̂L∗
R
(T ) into Π̂L∗
SC
(T ) we have
Π̂L∗
SC
(T ) = Π̂L∗
M






O (K − x̂L∗) dt
= qLΠI∗ (T )−O4XI∗ (T ) +KOT + (1− qL) ΠI∗ (T )−KOT +O4X̂L∗ (T )
= ΠI∗ (T )
Theorem 2.1(iv) When O = 0, we have
Π̂L∗
R
(T ) = (1− qL) ΠI∗ (T )
and Π̂L∗
M
(T ) = qLΠI (T ). 
We have a few observations from Theorem 2.1. First, the wholesale is constant
over time and below the manufacturer's per unit production cost. Therefore, the
manufacturer loses money in his wholesale transaction, and only makes money by
sharing the retailer's revenue. Second, when O is positive, the share of the prots
earned by the manufacturer is smaller than his share of revenue qL .
2.8.3 Revenue Sharing with a Short-term Retailer Strategy
In this section, we consider a revenue sharing contract {qS , ŵS (t)} signed by a
manufacturer and a retailer with a short-term protability strategy. Note that the
revenue sharing contract is not accompanied with up-front fees hence the retailer
exibly allocates her resources between the products that she sells. Suppose that the
manufacturer's objective is to set the wholesale price ŵS such that the instantaneous







{[(1− qS) r̂S (t)− ŵS (t)− s] x̂S (t) +O [K − x̂S (t)]}




[1− γr̂S (t)] , X̂S (0) = X̂0
Let πS∗
SC
(T ) be the channel's optimal life cycle prots.
Theorem 2.2. Consider a revenue sharing contract with qS ∈ [0, 1] and the








F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
F I∗ (XI∗ (t))
]
− s−O.






(1− qS)F I∗ (XI∗ (T )) +KO.
When O = 0, the retailer's optimal instantaneous prot rate π̂S∗
R
(t) is constant over






TF I∗ (XI∗ (T )) +KOT.
(ii) The manufacturer's instantaneous prot rate π̂S∗
M













and the cumulative life cycle prot Π̂S∗
M






4XI∗ (T ) + Tφ
2 (qS − 2)F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
.
(iii) The above revenue sharing contract coordinates the the channel, i.e., Π̂S∗
SC
(T ) =
ΠI∗ (T ). At any time t, the retailer's instantaneous sales rate is xI∗ (t) and the retail
price rI∗ (t).
Proof: For a given wholesale price trajectory ŵS (t), the retailer's best response
retail price trajectory r̂S (t) is obtained by taking the rst order condition of π̂S
R
with regard to r̂S :
∂π̂SR
∂r̂S
= 0 =⇒ (1− qS) [1− γr̂S ]− γ [(1− qS) r̂S − ŵS − s−O] = 0
=⇒ r̂S∗ = 1− q
S + γ (ŵS + s+O)
2γ (1− qS)
.
Suppose that manufacturer sets the wholesale price ŵS∗ in a way such that rS = rI .
Then the optimal wholesale price is obtained by solving the following equation:
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. Then, we have:
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To derive the retailer's life-cycle prot, we integrate π̂S∗
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T (1− qS)φ2F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
+KOT
Theorem 2.2(ii). The manufacturer's instantaneous prot rate is given by
π̂S∗
M
(t) = [ŵS∗ (t) + qS r̂S∗ (t)− c0 ] x̂S∗ (t)
=
[
(1− qS) [1− φRI∗ (XI∗ (t))]
γ
+
qS [2− φRI∗ (XI∗ (t))]
2γ



































4XI∗ (T )− Tφ
2F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
2γ
+





4XI∗ (T ) + Tφ
2 (qS − 2)F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
2.2(iii) We can derive Π̂S
SC
(T ) as follows:
Π̂S∗
SC
(T ) = Π̂S∗
M










4XI∗ (T ) + Tφ
2 (qS − 2)F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4γ
+







2F I∗ (XI∗ (T ))
4
= ΠI∗ (T )
Dierent from the revenue sharing with a long-term retailer protability strategy,
the wholesale price is no longer constant under a short-term retailer protability
strategy. The manufacturer will oer lower ŵS (t) with a higher O.
A computational experiment over the ranges of parameters in Table 1, shows
that the revenue sharing contract has the potential to increase the supply chain
prot by up to 72% when market saturation levels reach 45%.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the strategic interactions and decisions in a supply chain
to launch an innovative durable production in the context of a decentralized distribu-
tion channel. We analyze the potential conicts of interests between a manufacturer
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and an independent retailer in the retailer's choice of protability strategy and her
pricing decisions. Our results show that the length of selling horizon may greatly im-
pact the retailer's preference over her protability strategy, and thereby her pricing
strategy. Additionally, we investigate the impact of retailer's resource allocation on
the channel performance, and we propose a two-part tari to partially improve the
channel performance. Finally, we use the revenue sharing contracts to coordinate
the channel with both types of retailer protability strategy.
Our model allows the managers to improve the decisions in three ways. First, we
highlight the impact of retailer's prot optimizing strategy on the manufacturer's
as well as channel's prot. The manufacturer may need to monitor the retailer's
sales volume and retail price in order to implement his most preferred protability
strategy. Second, we demonstrate that the manufacturer may propose the revenue
sharing contracts to achieve full coordination. It is important to emphasize that a
sale commission agreement will have the properties of a revenue sharing agreement,
and we can point out that commission sales agreement are actually common in the
VARs distribution channel. However, for a commission sales agreement to coordinate
the channel we need the price of the product to be inclusive of the service component
of the IDP paid by the customer. That is, a commission sales agreement between
a manufacturer and a VAR that permits the VAR to charge additional fees for
services to the customer will not coordinate the channel. What is required is that
the manufacturer set a price for the IDP inclusive of all the required services and
then negotiate a commission with the VAR over the inclusive price precluding them
to charge additional fees to the customer. Finally, as a by-product, we characterize
the equilibrium retail and wholesale pricing strategies as functions of cumulative
sales rather than shadow prices as was done by in the literature. This leads to more
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convenient pricing guidelines.
Our diusion model in the context of a decentralized supply chain opens up
several avenues for future research. One direction is to model manufacturer level
competition. It would be interesting to investigate how the manufacturer's pricing
strategy and his preference over the retailer protability strategy change in com-
petitive environments. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to study how the
channel will be coordinated with competing manufacturers. Future research may
consider the dierent demand situations, such as products with repeat purchases,
and incorporation the alternative demand functions. Our model assumes that the
consumers do not postpone purchase on purpose in anticipation of future product
price. Modeling such strategic consumer behavior is a natural extension to this
work. Our model can also be extended to study dynamic two-part taris to secure
dierent amounts of selling resources throughout the planning horizon.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Slotting and Pricing
Decisions in a Durable Product
Supply Chain
3.1 Introduction
Consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer (he) sells an innovative durable
product (IDP) to an independent retailer (she) over its life-cycle of a xed time
horizon. During this period, the retailer makes decisions to inuence the retail
demand for the IDP in order to maximize her prot objective. We focus on four
important factors that aect the retail demand of the IDP. (a) Diusion eect
(network eect) by which we mean that the customers who have purchased the IDP
inform those who have not. (b) Saturation eect: Because the product is durable,
the consumers purchase only once during the selling horizon of the IDP. Therefore,
the more the cumulative adopters, the smaller is the remaining potential market. (c)
Retail price: The consumer demand for the product is inversely related to the unit
retail price charged. (d) Shelf space: While the shelf space has a positive impact on
the demand for the IDP, it is a scare resource for the retailer.
We formulate the problem in a Stackelberg dierential game framework. We
61
assume that the manufacturer takes the role of the leader in his relationship with
the retailer. Thus, the manufacturer announces his wholesale price to the retailer,
and the retailer decides on the retail price and the shelf space allocation over time
in order to maximize her prot objective, taking the wholesale price as given. When
setting the wholesale price, the manufacturer takes the retailer's best response into
consideration in order to maximize his life-cycle prot over the horizon. We consider
the following two retailer's prot strategies: (i) far-sighted strategy and (ii) myopic
strategy. By far-sighted we mean that the retailer maximizes her life-cycle prot
over the selling horizon, whereas by myopic we mean that the retailer maximizes
her instantaneous prot rates at each time instant in the selling horizon.
We address the following research questions. (1) For a given retailer's prot
strategy, what are the optimal pricing and slotting policies for the retailer and the
optimal wholesale pricing policy for the manufacturer? (2) Should the retailer be
far-sighted or myopic? (3) Does the manufacturer prefer the retailer to be far-sighted
or myopic? (4) Is there a conict of preference between the manufacturer and the
retailer?
The solution concept for the Stackelberg dierential game that we use is the
open-loop equilibrium. This means that the manufacturer and the retailer decide
on the their respective policies at the start of the game. It is known that an open-
loop equilibrium is time inconsistent if the leader cannot credibly commit to his
policy, i.e., if the leader is given the opportunity to revise his policy, he would, at
sometime during the selling horizon, switch to another policy dierent from the one
he chose at the beginning of the game. Hence, open-loop policies make sense only
when the leader can pre-commit to his policy (Jørgensen 2003). In this study, we
assume that the manufacturer is able to commit to his wholesale pricing policy.
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There is a vast literature on supply chain management dealing with stochastic
demand and modeled as newsvendor problems ( see De Kok and Graves 2003). A
serious limitation of such analyses is that they address only single period models.
Yet the real world problems are dynamic. Our work is an early attempt to formulate
supply chain management problems as dynamic games of Stackelberg type.
Our contributions include characterization of optimal solutions and their numer-
ical computations. Furthermore, based on these, we conclude that the following
possibilities may arise in terms of the preferred prot strategies of the game play-
ers. First, the manufacturer may not always prefer the retailer to have a far-sighted
strategy, i.e., the manufacturer sometimes is better o if the retailer is myopic. On
the other hand, the retailer's preference ( myopic /far-sighted) changes with market
characteristics and they do not always agree with the manufacturer's preference.
Our results show that both the manufacturer and the retailer are better o if the
retailer is far-sighted when the nal market saturation level is low. However, if the
level is high at the end of the horizon, the manufacturer is better o with a myopic
retailer, while the retailer prefers that the manufacturer sets his wholesale prices
assuming that she is far-sighted. The conict between the manufacturer and the
retailer over the preferred retail prot focus raises some contract implementation
issues that are worth exploring as a future research topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the
related literature. In Section 3.3 we introduce the demand model. In Section 3.4 we
study the case of a myopic retailer. In Section 3.5 we study the case of a far-sighted
retailer. In Section 3.6 we present a numerical study that compares the cases of
far-sighted and myopic foci. In Section 3.7 we conclude by summarizing the results
and pointing out future research directions.
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3.2 Literature Review
This research is closely related to the new product diusion and shelf space allocation
models in the marketing literature and the dierential game models in the optimal
control literature.
The Bass (1969) diusion model and its variants have been widely used to fore-
cast demand of a durable new product. We refer the readers to Mahajan et al.
(1990, 2000) for comprehensive reviews of this literature. The original Bass (1969)
model does not include price as a variable. A number of later papers extended the
Bass model by incorporating the (competitive) price impact on retail demand of an
IDP. These include Robinson and Lakhani (1975), Bass (1980), Dolan and Jeuland
(1981), Bass and Bultez (1982), Kalish (1983), Kalish and Lilien (1983), Clarke and
Dolan (1984), Thompson and Teng (1984), Rao and Bass (1985), Eliashberg and
Jeuland (1986), Raman and Charterjee (1995), and Krishnan at el (1999). Regard-
ing the market conditions, Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) and Thompson and Teng
(1984) analyze equilibrium oligopoly pricing, whereas the others study the optimal
monopolist pricing.
In the context of optimal dynamic pricing, an important consideration is whether
a rm maximizes its short-term prot or its long-term prot. Bass (1980) and Bass
and Bultez (1982) assume that the rm maximizes the current period (instanta-
neous) prot, and the pricing strategies that they obtain are myopic in nature, as
compared to (far-sighted) optimal pricing policies which maximize the rm's aggre-
gated prot over the product's life cycle. Robinson and Lakhani (1975) compared
the total prots resulting from far-sighted optimal pricing and myopic optimal pric-
ing. Their numerical results show that the dierences in prots are signicant,
whereas Bass and Bultez (1982) report only small dierences.
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As noted by Dolan and Jeuland (1981), it is very critical to properly incorporate
the impact of pricing into the demand model. Several papers, including Robinson
and Lakhani (1975), Dolan and Jeuland (1981), and Thompson and Teng (1984),
assume that the demand is an exponential function of price. In contrast, as in
Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) and Raman and Chatterjee (1995), we assume that
the demand is a linearly decreasing function of retail price.
Over the past three decades, the marketing researchers have devoted much at-
tention to study the impact of shelf space allocation on the sales. A number of the-
oretical and empirical studies have documented that sales increase with the amount
of allocated shelf space (Cox 1970, Curhan 1971, Curhan 1973). Curhan (1971,
Dreze et al. 1994) studies the relationship between allocated shelf space and sales in
supermarkets. Curhan hypothesizes that the shelf space elasticity is a function of a
product's physical properties, merchandising characteristics, and use characteristics.
Curhan concludes that the impact of changes in shelf space on sales is small relative
to the eects of the other variables such as retail price, brand name, and advertising.
through a series of eld experiments, Dereze et al. (1994) found modest gains (4%)
in sales and prots from increased customization of shelf space.
Recently, researchers have integrated marketing research (studies on the impact
of shelf space on sales) and operations management (inventory management) by
developing models that incorporate the impact of displayed inventory on demand,
including Brown and Tucker (1961), Corstjens and Doyle (1981, 1983), Bultez and
Naert (1988), Borin et al. (1994), Urban (1998), Wang and Gerchak (2001), Lim
et al. (2004). Urban (1998) and Wang and Gerchak (2001) assume that the de-
mand rate at the retail level depends on the shelf space allocated to the product.
Specically, in their models, the demand is an increasing and concave function of
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the merchandise displayed on the shelf, and they addressed the optimal level of that
inventory to be on the shelf. Recently, there are a few papers that jointly consider
the product assortment and pricing (Green and Saviltz 1994, Mcintyre and Miller
1999).
Dierential game models have been applied to analyze the strategic dynamic
interactions between the players. In the supply chain management literature, El-
ishaberg and Steinberg (1986), Bykadorov (2007), and Gutierrez and He (2007) have
applied these models in the context of a channel with a manufacturer and a retailer
(distributor). Elishaberg and Steinberg (1986) focus on the inventory and pricing
decisions of the manufacturer and the distributor who faces a stochastic demand. In
a dierential game framework, Bykadorov et al. (2007) derive the optimal control
of the manufacturer's prot via discounts. They analyze the types of games played
between the manufacturer and the retailer: a Stackelberg dierential game with
the manufacturer being the leader, and a Nash game. They compare the Stackel-
berg equilibrium solution with the Nash equilibrium solution. Our work is closest
in spirit and structure to Gutierrez and He (2007), who analyze dynamic pricing
decisions in a Stackelberg dierential game framework in the context of an IDP. We
extend Gutirrez and He (2007) by considering the impact of shelf space allocation
on the retail demand. This enables us to study the dynamic slotting decisions of
the retailer in addition to her pricing decisions. To our knowledge, this is the rst
paper that determines optimal pricing and shelf space allocation simultaneously in
a dynamic game framework.
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3.3 The Demand Model
The manufacturer produces an IDP whose retail demand follows a Bass type diu-
sion process. Let x (t) and X (t) be the instantaneous demand (rate of sales) and
cumulative sales at time t, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T denotes the selling horizon of the
IDP. The demand dynamics are described by the dierential equation





p (t) (M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t)) (1− γr (t)) , X (0) = X0
(3.1)
where p (t) is the shelf space allocated to the product at time t ∈ [0, T ], M denotes
the potential market size, (M −X (t)) is the unsaturated market size, α and β are
positive coecients of external and internal market inuences, respectively, and the
parameter γ > 0 measures the customer's sensitivity to the retail price r (t). Ac-
cording to our formulation, the sales rate x (t) is determined by four factors: the
external market inuence, the internal market inuence, the slotting decision, and
the retail price. We use a multiplicatively separable function in (3.1) to model the
impact of price, shelf space, and cumulative sales on the instantaneous demand rate.
The instantaneous demand rate is a linearly decreasing function of the retail price.
Linear demand functions have been used by a number of papers in the stream of
dynamic pricing that use the Bass model, such as Eliashberg and Jeuland (1988),
Raman and Chartejee (1995), and Kalish (1983). The
√
p (t) term in (3.1) signies
that the shelf space has marginal diminishing returns with respect to the instan-
taneous demand . The eect of the cumulative sales X (t) on the instantaneous
demand x (t) is as follows. Initially, the market is not saturated and the diusion
eect outweighs the saturation eect. Over time, the market gets saturated, which
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makes additional sales more dicult; thus as time progresses, the saturation eect
starts dominating the diusion eect.
We use superscripts M, R, and C to denote the manufacturer, the retailer,









denote the retailer's prot rate at time t, her total prot over the horizon T , the
manufacturer's prot rate at time t, and his total prot
3.4 Myopic Retailer
We consider the case of a retailer with short-term prot focus. The manufacturer
and the retailer play a Stackelberg dierential game. The sequence of the events is
as follows. The manufacturer announces the wholesale price trajectory w (·). Then
the retailer simultaneously decides the retail price trajectory r (·) and the shelf space
trajectory p (·). Rewriting p (t) as c2 (t), and calling c (t) as the slotting decision,
and with s0 denoting the retailer's unit selling cost and s denoting the unit cost
of the shelf space, we formulate the retailer's optimization problem at instant t for






(Xt (t) , r (t) , c (t) ;w (t)) = [r (t)− w (t)− s0 ] Ẋ (t)− sc2 (t) .(3.2)
The problem is to choose r (t) and c (t) to maximize π
R
(t) ,0 ≤ t ≤ T , subject to
x (t) = c (t) (M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t)) [1− γr (t)] , X (0) = X0 . (3.3)
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It should be obvious in the myopic case that the retailer's best response at time t
will be depend only on the past of the announced wholesale price trajectory, i.e., on
{w (τ) , 0 ≤ τ ≤ t}. Moreover, we can characterize the structure of these decisions





(t) ∂r (t) = 0 and ∂π
R
(t) ∂c (t) = 0 simultaneously gives the best response
r (t) = r∗ (X (t) ;w (·)) = 1 + γ (w (t) + s0)
2γ
, (3.4)
c (t) = c∗ (X (t) ;w (·)) = F (X (t)) (1− γr (t)) [r (t)− w (t)− s0 ]
2s
, (3.5)
where F (X (t)) = (M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t)). Here we have suppressed the argument
t as is in the control theory literature, and we shall do so from now on where the
arises no confusion in doing so. Substituting r into x and c we have
x =
F 2 (X) [1− γ (w + s0)]3
16γs
, c =
F (X) [1− γ (w + s0)]2
8γs
, (3.6)
where F 2 (X) denotes (F (X))2 . Note that the best retail price response r (t) de-
pends only on w (t) and the best slotting response c (t) depends on the cumulative
sales X (t) and the wholesale price w (t)at time t. The manufacturer takes the re-
tailer's best response (3.6) into consideration when solving his problem over the






[w (t)− c0] Ẋ (t) dt, (3.7)
Ẋ (t) =
F 2 (X (t)) [1− γ (w (t) + s0)]3
16γs
, X (0) = X0 , (3.8)
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where c0 is the manufacturer's unit production cost. We shall use the Maximum






(X (t) , w (t) , λ
M
(t)) = (w (t)− c0 + λM (t)) Ẋ (t)
=

















(T ) = 0, which raises from the fact that X (T ) is free. Using the rst order




= 0 =⇒ [1− γ (w + s0)]3 − 3γ [w − c0 + λM ] [1− γ (w + s0)]
2 = 0
=⇒ w (t) = 1 + γ [3c0 − 3λM (t)− s0 ]
4γ
. (3.11)
We note that the higher the λ
M
, the lower is the wholesale price w. This result is the
demonstration of the economic interpretation of the shadow price: λ
M
is the future
value of an additional unit of sales. When λ
M
> 0, the higher the λ
M
, the larger
is the future value of the additional sales. Thus, the manufacturer has an incentive
to lower the wholesale price w (t) to stimulate immediate sales. Substituting the
optimal wholesale price w (t) from (3.11) into r (t), x (t), λ̇
M
(t), and c (t), we have
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their values in equilibrium:
r (t) =



















Note that the equilibrium values of w (t), r (t), x (t), λ̇
M
(t), and c (t) are functions of
the state variable X (t) and shadow price λ
M
(t). Also, since the equilibrium values
of r (t) and x (t) depend on λ
M
(t), the retailer's optimal decisions depend on the
entire wholesale price trajectory w (·). Furthermore, one can easily see that there
is no reason for either player to change their policy in the middle of the game, and
therefore, the equilibrium in the myopic case is time consistent.
In the following lemma, we express λ
M
(t) in terms of X (t).
lemma 3.1. The shadow price trajectory λ
M




1− γ (c0 + s0)
γ
[√
(M −X (T )) (α+ βX (T ))
(M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t))
− 1
]
, t ∈ [0, T ] .
(3.16)





= − 2γF (X (t))
F ′ (X (t)) [1− γ (c0 + s0 − λM (t))]
,
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which can be written as
F ′ (X (t)) dX (t)
F (X (t))
= d lnF (X (t)) = − 2γdλM (t)
[1− γ (c0 + s0 − λM (t))]
.
We can now integrate both sides of the equation from t to T and simplify to obtain
(3.16). 
We observe that the sign of λ
M
(t) depends on the ratio of F (X (T )) to F (X (t)) .
Thus, when F (X (T )) ≥ F (X (t)) , λ
M




lemma 3.2. In an optimal solution for the myopic retailer, the wholesale price,
the retail price, the slotting decision, and the instantaneous sales rate, respectively,
w (t) =
















9F (X (T )) [1− γ (c0 + s0)]2
128γs
, (3.19)





2 (X (T )) [1− γ (c0 + s0)]3
1024γs
. (3.20)
Furthermore, the slotting decision is constant over time, and the retail price, the
wholesale price, and the instantaneous sales rate all peak at the same time.
Proof: Substitute for λ
M
(t) from (3.16) to (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14)
to obtain (3.17), (3.18), (3.19), and (3.20), respectively. The last part of the lemma
is obvious from a comparison of (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19). 























βtF 3/2 (X (T )) [1− γ (c0 + s0)]3
1024γs
. (3.21)
proof. Integrate (3.19) from 0 to t and rearrange terms to obtain (3.21). In order
to show the uniqueness, one can show that for t = T , (3.21) has a unique solution
for X (T ). In view of the fact that the left-hand side is increasing in X (t) , it follows
that X (t) is unique. 




81F 2 (X (T )) [1− γ (c0 + s0)]4
s (128γ)2
(3.22)










81TF 2 (X (T )) [1− γ (c0 + s0)]4
s (128γ)2
. (3.23)














F (X (T ))
F (X (t))
)
[1− γ (c0 + s0)]4
(3.24)
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[X (T )−X (0)] [1− γ (c0 + s0)]
γ
− 81TtF




Proof: Substituting r (t),w (t), x (t), and c (t) obtained in Lemma 3.2 into (3.2)
gives (3.22). Integrating (3.22) from 0 to t gives (3.23). Substituting w (t) and x (t)
obtained in Lemma 3.2 in the integrand of (3.7) gives (3.24). Integrating (3.24) from
0 to t gives (3.25). 
Based on these results, we conduct a numerical study with the following param-
eter values M = 1 × 107 , X0 = 0, α = 0.016, β = 8 × 10−9 , c0 = 100, s0 = 20,
s = 5× 107 , and γ = 5× 10−4 . We compute the decisions for various values of the
horizon T . Figure 3.1 shows the wholesale price trajectories for dierent values of
T . We observe two patterns of wholesale price trajectories: increasing over time (for
T = 25, 40, 45, 60) and initially increasing then decreasing (for T = 75, 80). Also, a
comparison of (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19), or Figures 3.1-3.3, reveals that these tra-
jectories of w (·), r (·), and x (·) mimic one another. Furthermore, we observe that
for lower values of T , the wholesale price curves move downward as T increases, and
beyond a certain value of T , the wholesale price curves move upward as T increases.
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Figure 3.1: Wholesale price trajectories with dierent horizons: Myopic retailer
Figure 3.2: Retail price trajectories with dierent horizons: Myopic retailer
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Figure 3.3: Instantaneous saes rate with T = 75: Myopic retailer
Using the same parameter values, we continue our numerical study to get fur-
ther insights. Table 3.1 reports the manufacturer's prot Π
M
(T ), the retailer's
prot Π
R















(T ) denotes the channel's prot, and the slotting decisions c,
which is constant throughout the horizon, and the market saturation level X (T ) /M
for dierent values of T . Interestingly, we nd that the impact of T on the manufac-
turer's (retailer's) share of the channel prot is not uniform in T . That is, his (her)
share of the channel prot initially decreases (increases) as T increases, and beyond
a certain value of T , his (her) share of prot increases (decreases) as T increases. As
for the slotting decision c, it initially increases as T increases, and beyond a certain
value of T , c decreases in T .
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Table 3.1 Prots, prot ratios, shelf decisions, and market saturation for dierent T : myopic retailer
T 5 10 25 40 45 60 70 75 80 150 250
ΠM (T ) (×108 ) 0.5521 1.1610 3.4700 6.9368 8.4111 13.377 16.766 18.419 20.031 37.930 53.689














× 100% 44.31 45.95 52.27 59.02 59.95 57.96 55.05 53.55 52.10 38.39 29.85
c =
√
p 0.4167 0.4386 0.5278 0.6482 0.6801 0.7157 0.708 0.70 0.69 0.56 0.4306
X(T )
M
× 100% 1.22 2.66 9.25 21.57 26.62 39.81 46.24 48.89 51.24 68.73 77.87
3.5 Far-sighted Retailer
In this section we study the model of a retailer focused on the long-term prot. We
use a bar over the variables to signify the retailer's far-sighted focus. The retailer's






{[r̄ (t)− w̄ (t)− s0 ] x̄ (t)− sc̄2 (t)} dt, (3.26)
x̄ (t) = ˙̄X (t) = c̄ (t)
(




[1− γr̄ (t)] , X̄ (0) = X̄0 .
(3.27)
The retailer's Hamiltonian H̄
R







X̄ (t) , r̄ (t) , c̄ (t) , λ̄
R








r̄ (t)− w̄ (t)− s0 + λ̄R (t)
)




(t), the shadow price associated with X̄ (t), satises the adjoint equation
˙̄λ
R




(T ) = 0. (3.29)
























r̄ − w̄ − s0 + λ̄R
]
− 2sc = 0. (3.31)
Their solution yields the best response retail price r̄ (t) and the best response shelf



















We make a number of observations from (3.32) and (3.33). First, for a given w̄,
the retail price r̄ is a decreasing function of λ̄
R
. Intuitively, when λ̄
R
> 0, meaning
that there is a positive future value of additional sales, the retailer is willing to lower
the retail price below the myopic level (λ̄
R
= 0). On the other hand, for a given
w̄, the shelf space allocation c̄2 is an increasing function of λ̄
R
. Thus, when there is
positive future value of additional sales, the retailer is willing to allocate more shelf
space to the product to increase its sales when compared to the myopic case. Finally,
since the retailer's best response also depends on λ̄
R
, which is aected by the future
portion of the announced wholesale price trajectory, i.e on {w̄ (τ) , t ≤ τ ≤ T}, we
see that the best response depends indeed on the entire wholesale price trajectory
w̄. This provides an important contrast to the case of the myopic retailer. As we
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will see, this dependence on λ̄
R
requires us to treat λ̄
R
as a state variable in the
formulation of the manufacturer's optimization problem. It is this requirement that
causes time inconsistency in the far-sighted case. For further details on the theory
of the Stackelberg dierential games, see Dockner et al. (2000).















Substitution of (3.32) and (3.34) into (3.27) gives the instantaneous sales rate as a
function of w̄, i.e.,













, X̄ (0) = X̄0 .(3.35)























The adjoint equation (3.29) for the shadow price λ̄
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(T ) = 0.
(3.37)







[w̄ (t)− c0] x̄ (t) dt, (3.38)
subject to (3.35) and (3.37).
Note interestingly that the instantaneous sales rate x̄ (t) and the retailer's shadow
price λ̄
R
(t) are the manufacturer's state variables. For further details on the theory
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and µ̄ are the shadow prices associated with X̄ and ˙̄λ
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, µ̄ (0) = 0. (3.41)
The boundary conditions λ̄ (T ) = 0 and µ̄ (0) = 0 arise from the fact that x (T ) and
λ̄
R
(0) are free. Note that λ̇
R




> 0 (resp. < 0).
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= 0 is ruled out as it would lead to x̄ = 0 according


































By substituting (3.44) into (3.38), (3.39), (3.42), and (3.43), we obtain a two-
boundary value problem consisting of four dierential equations. We solve this
problem numerically for the same set of the parameters values in Section 3.3 for the
myopic retailer.
The open-loop equilibrium we obtain in this case is time inconsistent. This is
because ū (t) does not stay at its initial value of zero. So if ū (t) 6= 0 at some time
τ > 0, then it is in the manufacturer interest to re-solve the problem at τ and
choose a new wholesale price trajectory from τ on that satises ū (t) = 0. The
intuition behind this behavior is that the manufacturer announces a wholesale price
trajectory at time zero that leads to the retailer's decisions that are favorable to
him. But by time τ , the retailer has executed her decisions in the interval [0, τ ],
and the manufacturer has no incentive to keep his promise. It is for this reason, we
have assumed that the outset of this paper that the manufacturer commits to his
announced wholesale price policy.
We make a number of observations. The retail and wholesale price trajectories
no longer mimic the instantaneous demand trajectory (Figures 3.4-3.6), as they did
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in the myopic case. Instead, we observe two patterns of wholesale price trajectories:
decreasing over time (for T = 5, 15, 20, 25) and initially decreasing then increasing
(for T = 45, 75, 100). As for the retail price, for all values of T in this study, it
increases over time. We observe that for lower values of T , the retail price trajectories
r̄(·) move downward as T increases, and beyond certain value of T , the retail price
curves move upward as T increases. A similar observation holds for the wholesale
price curves. We observe that for all values of T , the instantaneous sales rate
trajectory x̄(·) rises upward in T ( Figure 3.5). On the other hand, the behavior
of the slotting decision c̄ (·) is not constant over time, and is not uniform in T (see
Figure 3.6). We see that c̄(·) initially rises in T , and beyond a certain value of
T , it moves downward as T increases. Unlike the case of the myopic retailer, the
manufacturer's (retailer's) share of the channel prot in the far-sighted case is not
inform in T (Table 3.2). Instead, his/her share of the entire channel prot initially
decreases as T increases, and beyond a certain value of T , his/her share of the
channel prot increases/decreases as T increases.
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Figure 3.4: Wholesale price and retail price trajectories: Far-sighted Readier
Figure 3.5: Instantaneous sales rate: Far-sighted Readier
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Figure 3.6: Shelf space allocation: Far-sighted Readier
Table 3.2: Prots, prot ratios, and market saturation levels: Far-sighted retaier
T 5 10 15 25 40 75 100
Π̄
M
(T ) (×108) 0.6002 1.3343 2.2860 5.4804 12.085 22.827 30.481
Π̄
R














×100% 35.82 41.00 43.53 43.50 36.53 30.94 28.60
X(T )
M × 100% 1.35 3.30 6.45 19.28 33.26 44.93 50.75
We use the same parameter values as ones used for in the myopic retailer to
conduct a numerical study in the case of a far-sighted retailer (Table 3.2). Like the
case of the myopic retailer, the manufacturer's (retailer's) share of the channel prot
is not uniform in T . His (her) share of the entire channel prot initially decreases
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(increases) as T increases, and beyond a certain value of T , his (her) share of prot
increases (decreases) as T increases.
3.6 Myopic Focus versus Far-sighted Focus
So far, we have derived the pricing and slotting decisions separately for the myopic
and far-sighted retailers. We now address the following interesting questions: Will
the retailer be better o with a far-sighted or myopic focus? If so, when? What
is the manufacturer preference for the retailer's focus? Will the manufacturer and
the retailer have conict over the retailer's focus? If so, when? For a xed transfer
price charged by the manufacturer, the retailer is certainly better o having a far-
sighted focus. However, the manufacturer adjusts his wholesale price accordingly.
Therefore, it is not obvious that the retailer will always be better o with a far-
sighted focus.
In Table 3.3, we report the results based on our numerical computations, and
compare the player's life-cycle prots in the far-sighted retailer case to their prots
in the myopic retailer case. We observe that the manufacturer and the retailer
may have four dierent combinations of preferred retailer's prot foci, i.e., both
prefer a far-sighted retailer, both prefer a myopic retailer, one prefers a far-sighted
retailer and the other prefers a myopic retailer, and vice verse. Specically, the
manufacturer as well as the supply chain prefers a far-sighted retailer when the
market saturation level is low (corresponding to the cases of T = 30 and T =
50), whereas he prefers a myopic retailer when the market saturation level is high
(corresponding to the cases of T = 250 and T = 1200). When the market saturation
level is low, the retailer's preference is aligned with the manufacturer. That is, the
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retailer prefers the manufacturer to oer wholesale prices assuming a far-sighted
prot focus. However, as the market saturation level increases furthermore, the
retailer switches her preference to myopic prot focus. If the market saturation
level is extremely high (for example when T = 1200), the retailer again prefers to
be far-sighted.
Table 3.3: Preferred Retailer foci
T M's prot (×108) R's prot (×108) C's prot(×108) % Saturation Level
30 7.664, 4.467 6.476, 4.818 14.140, 9.286 25.29,12.63
50 16.107, 10.006 9.713,12.295 25.822, 22.301 38.39,31.48
250 51.021,53.689 16.791,23.177 67.812,76.866 62.23,77.87
1200 84.314,98.274 19.457, 18.707 103.777,116.98 75.44, 92.08
Note. Parameters are M = 1×107 ,X0 = 0, α = 0.016, β = 8×10−9 , γ = 5×10−4 ,s0 = $20, s =
5× 107 , and c0 = $100.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the dynamic wholesale and retail pricing and shelf-space allo-
cation in a decentralized durable product supply chain consisting of a manufacturer
and a retailer. We formulate the problem as an open-loop Stackelberg dierential
game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. Our
demand model extends the Bass-type diusion model by incorporating the impact
of retail price and shelf space allocation on the retail demand. We study two retailer
foci: myopic and far-sighted. We provide analytical results and numerical analysis
to obtain the Stackelberg equilibria for dierent life-cycle lengths. Furthermore, we
develop insights into conditions under which the both players prefer a far-sighted
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retailer, both prefer a myopic retailer, and one prefers a far-sighted and the other
prefers a myopic retailer and vice verse.
Our analysis opens up several opportunities for future research. First, the open-
loop equilibrium that we use is time inconsistent in the far-sighted retailer case. It
would be interesting to look into the feedback Stackelberg equilibria and related
time consistency issues. Second, further analysis of our model could be carried out
the issue of channel coordination. Third, our model can be extended to allow for
multiple competing retailers. This could combine our demand model with earlier
research by Eliashberg and Jeuland (1986) and Savin and Terwiesch (2005). Finally,




A Review of Stackelberg Dierential
Game Models in Supply and
Marketing Channels
4.1 Introduction
Stackelberg dierential game (DG) models have been used to study issues such as
inventory and production policies, outsourcing, capacity and shelf space allocation
decisions, dynamic competitive advertising strategies and pricing for new products
in the marketing literature (see Erickson 1995 for a review of Nash game models in
competitive advertising strategies). Stackelberg DG models have also been used to
the government's subsidy policy in new technology (Jørgensen and Zaccour 1999);
R&D investment in the energy industry (Harris and Vickers 1995), and monetary
and scal policies in economics (Xie 1997).
Most studies in the supply chain management have used the single-period newsven-
dor model as a means to study the strategic interactions between the channel mem-
bers. For fashionable products, the one-period newsvendor model may be an ap-
propriate approach. However, there are many market situations where this is not
appropriate. There has been some work recently that investigates the dynamic
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interactions between the channel members. Recently, a number of papers have ap-
plied DG models to treat dynamic interactions between the channel members in
decentralized supply and marketing channels. This review focuses on these appli-
cations. Specically, we review papers that analyze retail and wholesale pricing
and/or advertising strategies, slotting and pricing decisions to launch innovative
durable products, pricing and production, and investment in supply chain infras-
tructure. We focus primarily on Stackelberg equilibria as the solution concept for
the games under consideration. We shall begin our review with an introduction to
the basics of the Stackelberg DGs. We then summarize the important managerial
insights obtained in each of the studies being reviewed. Finally, we point out future
research avenues for applications of DGs in supply chain management.
The review is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the basic concepts
of the Stackelberg dierential games. In Section 4.3, we review the models that
derive the Stackelberg equilibria in the area of supply chain management. Section
4.4 dicusses the applications to marketing channels. Miscellaneous applications are
reviewed in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we conclude the paper and point out some
future research directions.
4.2 Basics of the Stackelberg Dierential Game
A dierential game has the following structure (1) the state of the dynamic system
at any time t is characterized by a set of variables called the state variables, (2)
there are controls to be decided by the game players, (3) the evolution of the state
variables over time is described by a set of dierential equations involving both state
and control variables, and (4) each player has an objective function that he/she
wants to maximize by his/her choice of decisions.
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We illustrate the basics of a Stackelberg dierential game involving two players
playing the game over a xed nite horizon T : a leader and a follower. Let X denote
the vector of state variables, w denote the control vector of the leader, and r denote
the control vector of the follower. The sequence of the play is as follows. The leader





denote the follower's and the leader's instantaneous prot functions,
respectively. The solution procedure for the Stackelberg dierential game is the
backward induction. That is, we rst solve the follower's problem by deriving the
follower's best response to the leader's announced policy. We then substitute the
follower's response into the leader's problem to solve for the leader's optimal policy.
This policy of the leader to together with the retailer's best response to this policy











(X (t) , w (t) , r (t)) dt
}
,
Ẋ (t) = F (X (t) , w (t) , r (t)) , X (0) = X0 , (4.1)
where the function F represents the rate of sales, ρ is the follower's discount rate,





, w) = π
R
(X,w, r) + λ
R
F (X,w, r) , (4.2)
where λ
R
is the vector of the shadow prices associated with the state variable X,









(T ) = 0. (4.3)
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Here we have suppressed the argument t as is standard in the control theory liter-
ature, and we will do whenever convenient and when there arises no confusion in
doing so.











We assume that the Hamiltonian H
R
is jointly concave in the variables X and r
for any given w. Then condition (4.4) is sucient for the optimality of r for a















(X,w, r(X,w, λR)) dt
}
,
Ẋ = F (X,w, r (X,w, λ
R









(T ) = 0,(4.6)
where µ is the leader's discount rate and the dierential equations in (4.5) and (4.6)
are obtained by substituting the follower's best response r = r(X,w, λR) in the
state equation (4.1) and the adjoint equation (4.3), respectively.. We formulate the
leader's Hamiltonian
HM = πM (X,λR, w, r (X,w, λR) , λM , ψ) + λF (X,w, r (X,w, λR))








































= µψ − λ
M















with the boundary conditions λ
M
(T ) = 0 and ψ (0) = 0.
Note that we use the open-loop Stackelberg solution concept to solve the leader
and the follower's problem. There are two types of Stackelberg equilibria: open-
loop and closed-loop. Open-loop solutions are said to be static in the sense that
decisions can be derived at one point in time, independent of the state variable
solutions obtained beyond that time. In contrast, closed-loop equilibrium strategies
are functions of time as well as the state variable. They are subgame perfect, if
they do not depend on initial conditions (closed-loop strategies that do not depend
on initial conditions are called feedback strategies.) They are perfect state-space
equilibria because the necessary conditions for optimality are required to hold for
all values of the state variables, not just values that lie on the optimal state-space
trajectories. Therefore, the solutions obtained should remain optimal even after the
game has begun. It is known that most open-loop Stackelberg equilibria have an
inherent instability of being time inconsistent. This means that given the oppor-
tunity to revise his strategy at any instant of time after the initial one, the leader
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would like to choose another strategy than the one he chose at the initial instant of
time. Thus, an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium only make sense if the leader can
credibly pre-commit to his strategy.
4.3 Supply Chain Management Applications
In this section we shall review applications in the supply chain management area. the
supplier or the manufacturer decides on the wholesale price and/ or his production
rate, whereas the retailer's decision variables are retail price and/or shelf-space
allocation.
4.3.1 Gutierrez and He (2007): Life-Cycle Channel Coordi-
nation
Gutierrez and He (2007) study a decentralized channel composed of a manufacturer
and a retailer to launch an innovative durable product (IDP). The manufacturer,
being the leader, announces the wholesale price trajectory rst, and then the retailer
follows by deciding on the retail price trajectory. While the manufacturer is assumed
to maximize his life-cycle prot from selling the IDP, the authors consider two types
of retailer's foci: (1) a far-sighted strategy of maximizing the life-cycle prot from the
IDP, and (2) a myopic strategy of maximizing the instantaneous prot rate at any
time t. They address the following research questions: Does the manufacturer prefer
the retailer to be far-sighted or myopic? Does the retailer prefer the manufacturer
to set the wholesale price assuming she is far-sighted or myopic?
Far-sighted Retailer. Consider the case when the retailer is far-sighted. For








[r (t)− w (t)− s] Ẋ (t)
}
dt (4.10)
Ẋ (t) = (M −X (t)) (α+ βX (t)) (1− γr (t)) , X (0) = X0 , (4.11)
where s is the selling cost including any opportunity cost, α and β are internal and
external inuence parameters, γ is the price sensitivity parameter, and X is the
initial value of the sold market. Let
F (X) = (M −X) (α+ βX) .





[w(t)− c0 ] Ẋ(t)dt, (4.12)
Ẋ(t) =














(T ) = 0, (4.14)
where c0 is the per unit production cost and λR is the retailer's shadow price.
Note that X and λ
R
are the manufacturer's two state variables, and their evolution
incorporates the retailer's best response.
Myopic Retailer. The retailer selects r(t) to maximize her instantaneous prot
rate [r (t)− w (t)− s] Ẋ (t) subject to (4.11). The manufacturer maximizes his life
cycle prots and his optimization problem is given by (4.12) and (4.13).
Gutierrez and He identied a conict of preferences between the manufacturer
and the retailer. First, a manufacturer does not always prefer the retailer to take
a long-term optimization focus; that is, he sometimes is better o if the retailer is
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myopic. On the other hand, the retailer's preferred focus changes with the market
conditions, and it does not always agree with the manufacturer's preference. Their
results show that both the manufacturer and the retailer are better o if the retailer
is far-sighted when the nal market is insuciently penetrated. However, if the
market saturation level is high like at the end of the planning horizon, the manufac-
turer will shift his preference and will be better o with a myopic retailer, while the
retailer prefers that the manufacturer sets the wholesale prices assuming that she is
far-sighted. However, monitoring the retailer sales volume or retail price becomes an
implementation necessity when the manufacturer oers a wholesale price contract
assuming the retailer is myopic. It is not immediately obvious that a seemingly
myopic retailer behavior may enhance the performance of the supply chain.
4.3.2 He and Sethi (2007): Pricing and Slotting Decisions
He and Sethi (2007) extend the work of Gutierrez and He (2007) by considering
the impact of shelf space allocation on the retail demand. They assume the retail
demand to be an increasing and concave function of the merchandise displayed on
the shelf. They do this by introducing the multiplicative term
√
p (t)to the right-
hand side of (4.11), where p (t) is the shelf space allocated to the product at time t.
They consider a linear cost of shelf space to be included in the retailer's objective
function (4.10). They solve for equilibrium wholesale and retail pricing and slotting
decisions, In connection with the strategic foci of the retailer, myopic and far-sighted,
they obtain results similar to those in Gutierrez and He (2007).
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4.3.3 Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987): Pricing and Produc-
tion Decisions
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) consider a decentralized assembly system composed
of a single manufacturer (he) and a single distributor (she). The distributor processes
further the product whose demand has seasonal uctuations. Pekelman (1974) uses











is the time varying total market potential, b
R
is the coecient of price sensitivity,
and P
R
(t) is the distributor's price. Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) assumes that
b
R
(t) is constant. Specically, they assume that the time varying market demand
potential a
R
(t) has the following form
a
R




. α1 , α2 and α3are positive parameters.
The manufacturer and the distributor play a Stackelberg game with the man-
ufacturer acting as the leader and the distributor the follower. The distributor
decides on the processing, pricing, and inventory policies. The manufacturer de-
cides the inventory and pricing policies. The distributor's problem, given that P
M










































(T ) = 0, IR (t) ≥ 0,
where Q
R
(t) is her processing rate, f
R
(·) is her processing cost function, h
R
is
her inventory holding cost per unit, and I
R
(t) is her inventory level. Similar to
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Pekelman, Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) use a linear holding cost function. They
also assume that the processing cost function f
R
is increasing and strictly convex.
The authors show that the distributor follows a two-part processing strategy.
During the rst part of her processing schedule, she processes at a constantly in-
creasing rate. This policy builds up inventory initially and then draws down in-
ventory until it reaches zero at a time t∗R. During the second part, which begins
at the stockless point t∗
R
, she processes at precisely her market demand rate. She
also follows a two-part pricing strategy. The price charged by the distributor is
rst increasing at a decreasing rate and then decreasing at an increasing rate. The
inventory builds up for a while and then reaches zero; from then on, the distributor
processes just enough to meet demand.
An intuitive interpretation is as follows. The distributor, facing a seasonal de-
mand which increases and then decreases, can smooth out her processing operations.
The reason that she may carry inventory initially is due to the assumption of convex
processing cost. In other words, if she does not carry any inventory throughout the
entire horizon, she could incur higher costs due to the convexity of her processing
cost function.
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Pekelman (1974) which uses a strictly convex increasing production cost function,
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) use a quadratic production cost function.
The authors characterize the manufacturer's policies as follows. The manufac-
turer follows a two-part production policy. During the rst part, he produces at a
constantly increasing rate. During the second part, which begins at the manufac-
turer's stockless point t∗
M
, he produces at exactly the distributor's processing rate.
In general, if the manufacturer's inventory holding cost per unit is suciently low
and the distributor's processing eciency and inventory holding cost per unit are
high, then the manufacturer can also smooth out his operations.
4.3.4 Desai (1992): Marketing-Production Channel under In-
dependent and Integrated channel
Desai (1992) analyzes the production and pricing decisions in a marketing-production
channel in which the retailer buys the good from the manufacturer and sells it to
the nal consumers. The retailer faces a price-dependent seasonal demand. Like

















T = π, where
T is the duration of the season. Dierent from Pekelman (1974) and Eliashberg
and Steinberg (1987) who use a linear holding cost function, Desai (1992) assumes
quadratic total production and holding cost functions and does not allow the retailer
to carry inventory.
Desai (1992) shows that once the production rate becomes positive, it does not
become zero again, which implies production smoothing. However, none of the gains
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of production smoothing are passed on to the retailer. The optimal production rate
and the inventory policy are a linear combination of the nominal demand rate, the
peak demand factor, and the salvage value, and the initial inventory. In the scenario
where the retailing operation does not require an eort, the pricing policies of the
manufacturer and the retailer and the production policy of the manufacturer have a
synergistic eect, i.e., an increase in the manufacturer's price or production rate or
the retailer's price leads to an increase in the rate of change of inventory. However, in
the scenario where the retailing operation does benet from the eort, the retailer's
pricing policy may not necessarily be synergistic with the other policies.
4.3.5 Desai (1996): Marketing-production channel under sea-
sonal demand
Desai (1996) diers from Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) in three ways. First,
Eliashberg and Steinberg (1987) restrict themselves to a contract in which the man-
ufacturer's wholesale price remains constant throughout the season, while Desai
(1996) allows the manufacturer to change the wholesale price over time (i.e., more
general arrangement). Second, he does not allow the retailer to carry inventory.
Third, he assumes a quadratic holding cost function, while Eliashberg and Stein-
berg (1997) use a linear cost function.
The manufacturer makes the production and pricing decisions while the retailer
decides on the processing rate and pricing policies. Desai (1996) considers three
types of contracts: contracts under which the manufacturer charges a constant price
throughout a season, contracts under which the retailer processes at a constant rate
throughout the season, and contracts under which the manufacturer and retailer
cooperate to make decisions jointly. He compares the optimal policies under three
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dierent contract types. He shows that the type of contract does not signicantly
impact the retailer's price. However, the type of contract has an impact on the
manufacturer's price and the production rate as well as the retailer's processing
rate. If the demand is not highly seasonal, a constant processing rate contract will
lead to higher production and processing rates, and a lower manufacturer's price
compared to a constant manufacturer's price contract.
4.3.6 Kogan and Tapiero (2007)a: Inventory Game with En-
dogenous Demand
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)a consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer
(leader) and a retailer (follower) facing time-dependent endogenous demand
depending on price set by the retailer. Furthermore, the retailer has a nite
production capacity, which requires consideration of the eect of inventory. Thus,
the retailer must decide on the price p (t)as well as the production rate u (t). The
manufacturer, on the other hand, has ample capacity and must decide on only the
wholesale price. The authors assume that the game is played over a season of




such as the Christmas
time, during which both the demand potential a (t) and the customer price
sensitivity b (t) are high. Specically, the demand D
R
= a (t) + b (t) p (t), where
a (t) =

a1 , t < tS and t ≥ tf
a2 , tS ≤ t < tf
b (t) =

b1 , t < tS and t ≥ tf
b2 , tS ≤ t < tf
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with a2 > a1 and b2 > b1 . Kogan and Tapiero (2007)a limit the manufacturer to set
a constant wholesale price w1 in the regular periods and w2 ≤ w1 in the promotion






[w (t)u (t)− csu (t)] dt
subject to w (t) ≥ cs .






[w (t) (a (t)− b (t) p (t))− cru (t)− w (t)u (t)− h (X (t))] dt
s.t. Ẋ (t) = u (t)− (a (t)− b (t) p (t)) ;
0 ≤ u (t) ≤ U ;
a (t)− b (t) p (t) ≥ 0; p (t) ≥ 0.
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)a obtain the optimal solution to the centralized problem
as well as the Stackelberg equilibrium. They require the system to begin in a
steady state at time 0, go to a transient state in response to promotional decisions,
and then revert back to the steady state by the end of the season at time T . Thus,
their solution is meant to be implemented in a rolling horizon fashion.
Under reasonable conditions on the parameters, the authors are able to derive
formulas for the equilibrium values of the regular and promotional wholesale prices
for the manufacturer. Then they show that it is benecial for the retailer to change
pricing and processing policies in response to the reduced promotional wholesale
price and the increased customer price sensitivity during the promotion. The change
is characterized by instantaneous jump upward in quantities ordered and downward
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in retailer prices at the instant when the promotion period starts and vice versa just
when the promotion ends. In fact, the retailer starts lowering her prices sometime
before the promotion starts. This causes a greater demand when the promotion
period begins, thereby taking advantage of the reduced wholesale price during the
promotion. This is accomplished gradually to strike a trade-o between the surplus/
backlog cost and the wholesale price over time. Specically, any reduction in the
wholesale price results rst in backlog and then in surplus. An opposite scenario
takes place on the side when the promotion periods ends.
In the symmetric case when unit backlog and surplus costs are equal, the authors
obtain the typical equilibrium as shown in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, due to
symmetric costs, the transient solution is symmetric with respect to the midpoint
of the promotion phase.
Finally, the authors show that due to inventory dynamics, the traditional two-
part tari does not coordinate the supply chain as it does in the static case. This
is because the manufacturer when setting the promotional wholesale price ignores
not only the retailer's prot margin from sales, but also the prot margin from
handling inventories. Of course, in the very special case when the manufacturer xes
a wholesale price throughout the season, the retailer's problem becomes identical to
the centralized problem and the supply chain is coordinated.
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Fig 4.1: Optimal policies with promotion
4.3.7 Kogan and Tapiero (2007)b: Inventory Game with Ex-
ogenous Demand
This game diers from Kogan and Tapiero (2007)a in two ways. First, the demand
is no longer price-dependent, and so pricing is not an issue. This simplies the
problem. Second, both the manufacturer and the retailer have limited capacities in
contrast to the previous game in which only the retailer has a limited capacity. This
complicates the ordering decisions which require multiple switching points induced
by coordinating inventory decision and capacity limitation. While the demand is
not price dependent, it varies with time. Thus, the optimal control problems faced
by each of the players is a standard dynamic inventory problem as discussed, e.g.,
by Bensoussan et al. (1974).
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Since production control appears linearly in these problem, the optimal produc-
tion can have three possible regimes: maximum production, (singular) production
on demand, and zero production. Sequencing of these regimes depends on the time-
varying nature of the demand and inventory cost parameters.
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)b consider the retailer as the leader and the manufac-
turer as the follower. They solve the problem explicitly in a special case of demand.
As for coordination, the authors show that if the retailer pays the manufacturer
for his inventory related cost, then the centralized solution is attained. They also
show that a two-part tari contract can also be obtained to coordinate the supply
chain.
4.3.8 Kogan and Tapiero (2007)c: Production Balance with
Subcontracting
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)c consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer
(follower) and one supplier/ subcontracter (leader). The supplier has ample capacity
and so the inventory dynamics is not an issue. The manufacturer, on the other
hand, has a limited capacity, and his decisions depend on the available inventory.
The product demand rate at time t is a(t)D, where D is a random variable and a(t)
is known as the demand shape parameter. This assumption is reasonable in the case
of fashion goods.
The realization of D is observed only at the end of a short selling season, and
as a result, the manufacturer can only place an advance order to obtain an initial
end-product inventory, which is then used to balance production over time with the
limited in-house capacity.
Thus, the problem is a dynamic version of the newsvendor problem which incor-
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porates production control. The supplier's problem is to set a constant wholesale
price to maximize his prot from the advance order from the manufacturer. The
manufacturer must decide on the advance order as well as the production rate over
time in order to minimize his total expected cost of production, inventory/ backlog,
and advance order. The authors are able to transform this problem to a determinis-
tic optimal control problem, which can be solved to obtain the manufacturer's best
response to the supplier's announced wholesale price.
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)c consider unit in-house production cost to be greater
than the supplier's cost. They show that if the supplier makes prot (i.e., has a
positive margin), then the manufacturer produces more in-house and subcontracts
less than the centralized solution. This is due to the double marginalization not un-
like in the static newsvendor problem. Furthermore, if the manufacturer is myopic,
he also orders less than the centralized solution even though he does not produce
in-house since he does not take into account the inventory dynamics.
While the optimal production rate over time would depend on the nature of the
demand, it is clear that optimal production will have intervals of zero production,
maximum production, and a singular level of production. The authors also solve a
numerical example and obtain the equilibrium wholesale price, the manufacturer's
advance order quantity, and his production rate over time.
4.3.9 Kogan and Tapiero (2007)d: Outsourcing Game
Kogan and Tapiero (2007)d consider a supply chain consisting of one producer and
multiple suppliers, all having limited production capacities. The suppliers are the
leaders and set their wholesale prices over time that maximize their prots. In
response to these, the producer decides on his in-house production rate and supple-
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ments this by ordering from a selection of suppliers over time in order to meet a
random demand at the end of a planning period T . The producer incurs a penalty
for any unmet demand. Unlike in the previous section, no assumption regarding
the cost of in-house production and the supplier's production cost is made in this
model. The producer's goal is to minimize his expected cost.
As in the previous section, the authors transform the producer's problem into a
deterministic optimal control problem. Because the producer's problem is linear in
his decisions, his production rate can have one of three regimes as in the previous
section, and his odering rate from any chosen supplier will also have similar three
regimes.
The authors show that the greater the wholesale price of a supplier, the longer
the producer waits before he orders from that supplier. This is because the producer
has an advantage over that supplier up to and until a breaking point in time for
outsourcing to this supplier is reached. As in the previous model, here aslo when a
supplier sets his wholesale price strictly above his cost over the entire horizon, then
the oursourcing order quantity is less than that in the centralized solution.
Once again, the supply chain is coordinated if the suppliers set their wholesale
price equal to their cost and get lump sum transfers from the producer.
4.3.10 Bykadorov et al. (2007): Trade Discount Policies
Bykadorov et al. studies the trade discount in the context of dierential games
framework. The manufacturer controls the dynamic discount rate and the retailer
controls the dynamic shelf-price (pass-through). The paper considers two cases: the
case with the manufacturer being the game leader and the case with the retailer
being the game leader.
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4.4 Marketing Channel Applications
4.4.1 Jørgensen et al. (2000): Dynamic Cooperative Adver-
tising
Jørgensen et al. (2000) studies a two-member channel in which a manufacturer and a
retailer can make advertising expenditures that have both long-term and short-term
impacts on the retail demand.
The manufacturer controls his rate of short-term advertising eort and long-
term advertising advertising eort. The manufacturer and the retailer can enter
into a cooperative advertising program in which the manufacturer pays a certain
share of the retailer's advertising expenditure. The manufacturer is a Stackelberg
game leader in designing the program: He announces his advertising strategies and
support rates for the retailer's long-term and short-term advertising eorts.
The results show that both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer full support
to any of the two kinds of support, which is preferred to no support at all.
4.4.2 Jørgensen et al. (2001) : Impact of Stackelberg Lead-
ership on Channel Eciency
Jørgensen et al. (2001) studies the eects of strategic interactions in both pricing
and advertising in a channel consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. They
consider three scenarios: each channel member simultaneously decides its margin
and advertising rate, the scenaro with the retailer acting as the leader, and the
scenario with the manufacturer acting as a leader. The manufacturer controls his
margin m
M
(t) and rate of advertising A
M
(t). The retailer controls her margin
m
R
(t) and her advertising rate A
R
(t). The retailer price
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The demand rate D
R




















are positive parameters; G (t) is the stock of
brand goodwill. Jørgensen et al. (2001) assumes that the retailer is myopic, meaning
that she is only concerned with the short-term eects of her pricing and advertising
decisions. The manufacturer is concerned with his brand image, as reected in the
goodwill stock which evolves according to the Nerlove-Arrow (1962) dynamics:
Ġ (t) = α
M
(t)− δG (t) , G (0) = G0 ≥ 0,




















































The authors show that the manufacturer and retailer leadership in a channel
are not symmetric as in pure pricing games. The manufacturer leadership improves
channel eciency and is desirable in terms of consumer welfare, but the retailer
leadership is not desirable for channel eciency and for consumer welfare.
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4.4.3 Jørgensen et al. (2003): Retail Promotions with Nega-
tive Brand Image Eects
Jørgensen et al. (2003) consider a distribution channel with a manufacturer and a
retailer. The manufacturer (he) advertises in the national media to build up the
image for his brand. The retailer (she) promotes locally the brand (by such means
as local store displays and advertising in local newspapers) to increase sales revenue,
but these local promotional eorts are assumed to be harmful to the brand image.
Jørgensen et al. (2003) analyze two rms in a cooperative program in which the
manufacturer supports the retailer's promotional eorts by paying part of the cost
incurred by the retailer when promoting the brand. The two rms play a Stackelberg
game where the manufacturer is the leader. They address the question of whether
the cooperative promotion program is possible and whether the retailer's decision
on being a myopic or far-sighted will aect the implementation of a cooperative
program.
Let A (t), B (t) , and G (t) denote the manufacturer's advertising rate, the re-
tailer's promotional rate, and the brand image, respectively. The dynamics of G (t)
is described by the dierential equation
Ġ (t) = aA (t)− bB (t)− δG (t) , G (0) = G0 > 0,
where a and b are positive parameters measuring the impact of the manufacturer's
advertising and retailer's promotion, respectively, on the brand image and δ is
the decay rate of the brand image. The sales revenue rate of the product is
Q (B (t) , G (t)) = dB (t) + eG (t) , where d and e are positive parameters that rep-
resent the eects of promotion and brand image on current sales revenue. With this
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formulation of the demand and the revenue, the retailer faces a trade-o between the
sales volume and the negative impact of the local advertising on the brand image.
The manufacturer and the retailer incur quadratic advertising and promotional
costs C (A (t)) = µ
A
A2/2 and C (B (t)) = µ
B
B2/2, respectively. Let D (t) denote
the amount the manufacturer contributes to the retailer's promotion cost. The
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Jørgensen et al. show that a cooperative program is implementable if the initial
value of the brand image G0 is suciently small, and if the initial brand image is
intermediate but promotion is not too damaging (i.e., b is small) to the brand
image.
4.5 Miscellaneous Applications
4.5.1 Jørgensen and Zaccour (1999): New Technology Sub-
sidy
This paper studies the problem of new technology subsidy problem. Specically, the
government uses two instruments: price subsidies and guaranteed buys, to accelerate
the adoption of new technology. The government acts as the leader and the rm is
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the follower.
4.5.2 Kogan and Tapiero (2006): Co-Investment in Supply
Chain Infrastructure
This paper considers a supply chain with N rms. Let K (t) denote the current
level of the supply chain infrastructure capital, L = (L1 , ...LN ) a vector of the labor
















< 0. The process of capital accumulation is given by





(t) , K (0) = K0 , f(K(t), Lj(t)) ≥ Ij (t) ≥ 0, j = 1, ...N.




























, j = 1, ...N,
where pj is the price, cj is the unit labor cost, CI (.) is the investment cost function,
and θ is the portion of the cost that is subsidized.
The authors derive the Nash strategy as well as the Stackelberg strategy for the
supply chain where rms are centralized and controlled by a supply chain manager.
Their results show that the Stackelberg strategy applied to consecutive subsets of
rms will result in an equilibrium identical to that obtained in case of a Nash supply




The supply chain and marketing channel management has attracted a great deal of
attention in the operations management and marketing literature in the last decade.
In the supply chain management literature, most of the models are based on the
one-period newsvendor models and, therefore, are limited to examine the one-shot
interactions between the channel members. In practice, the channel members may
often interact with each other frequently. It is thus natural to explore how their
decisions evolve over time. Unfortunately, the insights under the assumption of
one-shot interaction cannot be extended into the dynamic situations. For such
situations, the dierential game modeling approach can be used. However, we have
not observed many models that use this approach.
There are a number of reasons that have limited the applications of the Stack-
elberg dierential games to the supply chain management area. Open-loop Stack-
elberg equilibria are used because of their mathematical tractability. But these
equilibria are in general not time consistent. On the other hand, the closed-loop
equilibria are hard to obtain. Even in the open-loop case, numerical analysis is
needed to get insights into the impact of key parameters on the issues under exam-
ination. It may be possible to limit the class of the feedback policies for analysis
of the closed-loop equilibria. Finally, researchers have adopted deterministic dif-
ferential game models, even though the situations that are modeled are aected
by uncertain factors. For these applications, it would be of interest to apply the
stochastic dierential game models.
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